Thursday, May 26, 2011

No Escaping the Basics

There is no escaping the basics. Two articles in today's New York Times caught my attention, and did so as a couplet. On page 1 there is a story about some research showing that the change in the nature of American jobs is a major cause of the country's obesity epidemic. Fewer jobs are manufacturing jobs and fewer jobs require workers to exert themselves physically, thus burning off calories. This is so obvious that one wonders why a study had to be financed to show it. But I suppose it's good to have some details.

No one is claiming that changes in the nature of labor fully explain the obesity epidemic, or at least I hope no one is claiming that. Obviously, the obesity epidemic in children is one of the most worrisome things to be concerned about, and children don't even have jobs. Clearly, the size of plates, the size of portions, the crap filled with corn syrup that agribusiness sticks into processed food in order to maximize their profits, the Federal government's agricultural subsidies, which are closely related to the former, the sub-threshold addictive characteristics of information technology that has now surpassed television in creating the proverbial couch potato, and more besides are all related to the obesity epidemic. And the obesity epidemic, in turn, is a major influence in healthcare costs, because everybody knows that overweight people are expensively unhealthy. There is just no getting away from the basics, and basic causal connections.

The second story is buried back on page A22. The headline reads, "Married Couples Are No Longer a Majority, Census Finds." According to the article, married couples dropped below half of all American households some years ago, sometime during the past decade, but only the 2010 census data show the shift. Deeper down in the article is really quite a breathtaking statistic. Married couples represented 48% of American households in 2010, compared to 78% in 1950. That is a shocking change in just 60 years. On a state-by-state basis, in 2000 there were only six states in which the number of married people constituted less than half the population; by 2010 that number had jumped to 37 states. That is a shocking change in just 10 years. According to experts cited in the article, the biggest change over the past 10 years was a jump in the number of households headed by women without husbands––up 18% in just one decade.

This is a complicated subject. For one thing, in the lower strata of the American socioeconomic ladder, far more men of working age are not working than women. According to the basic data, it's something like 1/5, which by historical standards is huge for the United States. This ramifies into marriage statistics because, as the article points out and as many other studies have indicated, single women can sometimes get by supporting themselves and their children, but it is much harder to also support a nonworking spouse. Solution? Don't get married or stay married, and so don't get yourself obligated to a nonworking spouse in the first place. This means that changes in the American political economy in the context of globalization, with so many lower-level manufacturing jobs having been exported over the past 30 years, have a direct effect on the marriage rate.

But whatever the reasons are for the decline of marriage, the impact on society ought not to be uncontroversial: It's bad for kids. It is much more difficult to convey basic values and provide the building blocks of integrity for adult personalities in the context of broken and stressed families. A fellow named W. Bradford Wilcox, the director of the National Marriage Project at the University of Virginia, has it about right, it seems to me: "It's troubling because those kids are much more likely to be exposed to instability, complex family relations and poverty."

But, of course, this basic point remains controversial. It has been controversial for many years. When Daniel Patrick Moynihan made this same point back in the 1960s in the context of trying to understand poverty among blacks, he was ridiculed for it. Since then we have had a whole host of people telling us that the nuclear family has no effect at all on the building of character and consequently in the cumulative quotient of right and wrong behavior in society. The nuclear family has been pillaged for inculcating the horrors of patriarchy. Indeed, a lot of the trashing of the nuclear family has had to do with the frantic efforts of feminists to show that their supposed liberation could not possibly have any downside for society as a whole.

(One must be careful here; the nuclear family is not an ideal institution within which to raise children either. In modern society, the nuclear family is a vulnerable and more often than it should be a dysfunctional institution. A good case can be made that a proper interpretation of the phrase "it takes a village" actually makes a whole lot of sense if by it one means that just a mother and a father require help to raise healthy children; except of course that the way that phrase was used was improper––namely, it was used as yet another battering ram against the nuclear family. All I am saying here is that the nuclear family is better for children than no family at all, and that imagining that the nontraditional sexual cohabitation patterns so ubiquitous in America today themselves somehow automatically produce the functional equivalent of a nurturing " village" is totally unwarranted. This is a little like saying that a drug-induced hallucination is the functional equivalent of normal dreaming.)

Unfortunately for the feminists of 30 years ago, life just does not work the way they hoped it would. Today, as Kay Hymowitz has argued, many young women look around and ask themselves, where are all the real men? And they honestly don't have a clue as to the answer, which is that post-feminist political correctness has wussified the vast majority of them. We cannot escape the basics: Reality is a synonym for trade-offs. You get something valuable, you invariably risk losing something valuable. Over the years a mountain of irrefutable social science research has shown exactly the opposite of the feminist claim. Liberals just don't want to hear it, so they don't. Indeed, some liberals go so far as to claim, in a closely related subject area, that the environment of the home has no impact on early childhood education, a contention that only an intellectual or a partisan moron could believe.

In this case, I would suggest that the evidence seems to show that even obesity is related to the breakdown of the family. That is how I combine these two articles from today's paper. In addition to the factors I noted above that lie behind the obesity epidemic, another very likely is stress. A lot of people eat more when they're stressed out. A lot of people eat more when they eat alone, too; constant snacking is a sign of stress and loneliness is notorious for producing stress or adding to its other sources. And obviously, people, especially of modest economic means and not too much education about nutrition, are far more likely to eat fast-food garbage, which is extremely fattening, if they don't have a family to go home to, especially one where someone takes the time to prepare a home-cooked meal. Taking time to prepare and share a meal with the family amid conversation reduces stress and you eat less, too, because you are more psychologically as well as nutritionally satisfied––especially if you right-size your plates, as well. You can't avoid the basics.

My wife has wisely warned me not to become a curmudgeon in my older age. I try. I even created a sign that I post in my office to help me remember.





But when I think about these two articles together, it makes me sad. I can't help feeling that things have changed in the United States largely for the worse in my lifetime. Not only are we a fatter nation and one less able to raise honest successor generations, but our political system is also broken. It is broken for many reasons, but the one that stands out most has a very simple name: corruption. Our political class (read: Congress) and our high business class (read: Wall Street) are made up increasingly of people who do not know right from wrong, or if they do know right from wrong somehow manage to persuade themselves that it doesn't apply to them. We have driven the social power of religion from public space, and just like the feminists who promised us no harm possible in all they sought, the secularists who promised us no harm from all they sought have also been proven deeply and deadly wrong. Into this void an old menace has slowly but ineluctably crept, and it is the menace of plutocracy. Our laws are up for auction to the highest bidder, and so is their enforcement. We no longer take seriously the wisdom in the motto of my alma mater: "Leges sine moribus vanae."

Tax law is a very good example. It is bought by the rich, for the rich. And what money can't buy in terms of law proper, money can buy in terms of shady lawyers and accountants who create the filthy space that should not exist between mere tax avoidance and tax evasion. An elite that cannot tax itself is an elite in very serious trouble in the long and not-so-long run. At a certain point even a bread-and-circus distracted population will notice and get tired of subsidizing the decadence of their social "betters." Remember the French Revolution? A word to the would-be wise.

Am I really trying to draw a link between the decline of marriage and the decay of our political system? You're damned right I am. You can't escape the basics. A governmental system is only as good as the people who make it up. That is why very many years ago Thomas Carlyle was able to conclude that "no reform save a moral one will avail." He was right then, and he's still right now. That is why, to take a contemporary example, a society composed of basically honest people polices itself, and there is no need for draconian regulation of the market. But a society that is composed of basically dishonest people cannot be saved even by draconian regulation. That is the simple truth that, unfortunately, the current debate over regulating the financial system in the wake of the 2008 collapse never addresses.

As long as very large and even growing numbers of Americans respect no social norms beyond what their individual ambition chooses to abide, as long as so many of us lack the self-restraint that flows from the mutual obligations of a stable family, we will have a society, and that society will have a government, that is decadent and dysfunctional. There is no gimmick that can save us. There is no man promising hope and change that can really make a difference. There is no escaping the basics.

Wednesday, May 25, 2011

A guide for the perplexed, the partisan or the merely clueless

Watching the political circus here in Washington, and not only in Washington, often throws up no little frustration. People in this town say the damnedest things sometimes. The typical think tank event here is rich in posturing and positioning, far poorer in any capacity to recognize, let alone follow, rules of evidence normal, for example, in any halfway serious university discussion. As a recovering speechwriter for a cabinet level principal, I am well aware of the various techniques of impression management that are honed to fine art here and in other political capitals. That doesn't mean, however, that I like a steady diet of them.

At my age I thought myself appropriately jaded, so that nothing could surprise me or deprive me of my normal supply of oxygen. I was wrong. The orgy of idiocy that has broken out over one paragraph of President Obama's May 19 speech on the Middle East has shocked even a veteran observer like me. I am referring, of course, to the statement the President made about the 1967 lines being, with land swaps, the basis for negotiating secure and recognized borders between Israel and a future Palestinian state.

I commented on this statement and on the fracas that began to erupt within hours of the President's speech in an earlier post, one called "79 Notes", in which I annotated the President's remarks. I want now to revisit and expand my analysis because so much as happened even in the past few days that my original commentary now seems inadequate and outdated.

Let me preface my remarks by reminding readers that in "79 Notes" I rued the fact that the President spoke of Israel/Palestine matters at all. In my view, that decision was a deflection from the main purpose of the speech, which was to give the so-called Arab Spring its due, and to enunciate U.S. policy toward it. As I said then, the President rightly noted that the Arab–Israeli conflict had been used by generations of Arab autocrats to deflect attention away from their regimes' inability to provide for the citizens of their countries. It therefore seemed to me unwise for the President, in essence, to contribute to that deflection. Given what has happened since Thursday, there can be no doubt that this has been the result. For every thought or commentary that has been devoted to what the President said about the Arab Spring, at least a hundred thoughts and commentaries have been devoted to this silly business about the 1967 lines, what the President said, what it meant, what he meant to say, what the Israeli Prime Minister said a few days later, and so on and so forth literally, in my case, at nauseum.

Why do I say that this business is silly? Because the President literally said nothing new. Even in the way he said it there was nothing particularly new. For those who have been following the intricacies of Arab-Israeli diplomacy over the years, the truth of this statement will be manifest––at least to those who wish to make an effort at objective assessment. For those who have not been following it, or for those who are too young to have had a chance to follow it, there must be an abiding confusion over just what the hell is going on. So at the risk of boring the initiated, let me explain, in terms as simple as I can make them, just exactly what the hell is going on.

Let us start with what the President actually said, shall we? (Alas, some commentators seem to have been content to take their lead from other commentators without having actually heard or read what the President said.) Here, exactly, is what he said:
“The borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states.”

You will notice that the phrase “land swaps” is included within the selfsame sentence in which the 1967 lines are mentioned. Indeed, it is mentioned without there being even a comma to separate the two parts of the sentence. Aside from the explicit mention of the year 1967, I cannot see how this logically departs from the Clinton parameters in any way.

Ah, the Clinton parameters––what are they? To make a very long story very short, the Clinton parameters, announced in the year 2000 just days before President Clinton left office, represented the distillation of the discussions at Camp David in the summer of that year and in certain discussions thereafter. This was an American attempt to preserve what appeared to be major areas of agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian delegations as they met at and after Camp David to discuss then Prime Minister Ehud Barak's proposal for a peace settlement. There is no text of what President Clinton said to the delegations but there are authoritative notes that capture the essence, and neither side disputes the accuracy of these notes. (At least they can agree on something, it just goes to show.) In the Clinton parameters the President talks about the West Bank being given over to a new Palestinian state in the mid-90s, which means, as later explicitly stated, between 94 and 96% of the West Bank. If Israel were to annex between 4 and 6% of the West Bank, wherein live more than 80% of the settler population, it was presumed that to compensate Palestinians for that small area, agreed chunks of pre-1967 Israel would be turned over to the Palestinian state.

The Clinton parameters represented an attempt to detail what had always been U.S. policy since the 1967 war, which followed the U.S. interpretation of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, namely resolution 242 and, somewhat less centrally in this case, resolution 338. The American interpretation of resolution 242 has always been that Israel would withdraw from territories occupied as a result of the June 1967 war. Territories, not the territories or all territories. That is not what the resolution says and that was deliberate: the man who drafted it, Eugene Rostow, knew exactly what he was doing, and I know allthis because he told me so.

The American position has always recognized that the 1967 lines, as they are commonly referred to today, were really the 1949 armistice lines, based on the series of bilateral armistice accords worked out in Rhodes after the 1948 war. These armistice lines differed from the dividing lines between Israel and Egypt, and between Israel and both Syria and Lebanon. Those lines were and remain international borders. Given the transitional nature of the armistice lines separating Israel from what Jordan called the West Bank, resolution 242 focused not on lines for their own sake, but rather on borders that are defensible. Therefore, it has always been U.S. policy, since the Johnson Administration, to see the 1967 lines as a basis for negotiation between the parties, but no one ever expected the lines themselves to be the final borders. The Clinton parameters, by specifying the degree of change from the 1967 lines––4 to 6%––and by creating the concept of land swaps, may be fairly said to have advanced and detailed U.S. policy rather than to have changed it.


Now, in April 2004, President Bush codified this understanding by stating, privately but authoritatively, to the Israeli government that the U.S. government did not expect Israel to withdraw from all of the territories it occupied in the 1967 war, but this statement had particular reference to settlements very near, in most cases, the 1967 lines and in which, as already stated, the vast majority of Israeli settlers lived. One could argue that defensible borders and borders that took in major Israeli settlement blocs are one and the same, but they are not exactly the same. Nevertheless, in a sense, the April 2004 letter serve the same function as the Clinton parameters: namely, it further specified what had already been long-standing U.S. government policy.

There have been differences among administrations over other questions, notably Jerusalem. But on the question of borders there really has not been any variance to speak of. And there still isn't any variance.

As I said in my earlier posting, I can only think of three possible reasons as to how a normal, English–literate adult could so egregiously misread the President's remark made last Thursday. One of these reasons is sheer ignorance. It is possible, I suppose, that people who know none of the history that I have just briefly sketched heard the President and thought that he was invoking the 1967 lines for the very first time. A second reason has to do with politics––partisan politics, that is. I can imagine some listeners understanding exactly that the President had said nothing new, but nevertheless took the opportunity to claim that he did in such a way as to make hay politically against him. Avaricious Republicans may well have been thinking about the vote in Florida in 2012 upcoming. Florida has proven recently to be a tight and a critical swing state in presidential elections, and it is one of only a very few states where the Jewish vote matters. Of course, in order to peddle a falsehood to people, one has to count on either their ignorance or their credulity. And that brings me to the third reason for why some people seem to have misunderstood what the President said.

There are a lot of people out there who just don't like Barack Obama. Their minds are made up before he opens his mouth that whatever he says they are determined to disagree with. Most Jews in the United States supported Obama, as they have supported virtually every Democratic candidate for the last century and more. But early in the administration President Obama said and did things with regard to Israel that gave many of these supporters second thoughts. Some concluded that he had no warmth in his heart for Israel. This led some people to conclude, however irrational it is, that he feels antagonistic toward Israel. So their minds are already predisposed to hear bad things out of the mouth of Barack Obama even when no such sounds are in fact present. Credulity thus combined with ignorance to allow politically partisan entrepreneurs to create impressions despite a total lack of evidence to support them. And that, in a nutshell, is what I think has happened.

Things have gotten even stranger as a result of two additional speeches: Obama's speech at the AIPAC convention on Sunday, and then Prime Minister Netanyahu's address to Congress a few days later. Let's carefully review, at least in brief, what happened.

When president Obama addressed AIPAC on Sunday night, he was obviously distressed that, in his view, much of what he had said three days earlier had been misinterpreted. He was right that what he said had been misinterpreted, though he did not offer a theory as to why. Again, it is important to focus on exactly what the President said. He said:"Let me re-affirmed what `1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps' means. By definition, it means that the parties themselves––Israelis and Palestinians––will negotiate a border that is different than the one that existed on June 4, 1967. That's what ' mutually agreed swaps' means. It is a well-known formula to all who have worked on this issue for a generation." The President also added, just in case anybody still didn't get it, "there was nothing particularly original in my proposal."

It's enough to drive you completely crazy, but even after the President clarified what he meant, and did so in no uncertain terms, there were still people urging him to clarify what he meant! The TV cameras roamed the floor at the AIPAC convention after the President spoke, trolling for newsworthy comment, and one hapless interviewee said to a reporter, in effect––I am paraphrasing here––"Well, I'm confused; I don't know what to believe––what the President said on Thursday or what he said here tonight." The fact that the President said on Sunday night exactly what he had said on Thursday seemed to make no impression on this fellow or on many of his associates. The Thursday remark had already been so much spun beyond reality, that the spin itself had taken on a life of its own. Now, was this person ignorant, partisan, or credulous? It is very hard to know. He may have managed to be all three, and he was hardly alone.

In defense of those who mistook what the President said, there were and there remain contextual issues to be considered. Although hardly anyone has mentioned it, other things the President said on Thursday did depart from the Clinton parameters and really were news, at least news within the glass bead game labyrinth of Arab-Israeli diplomacy. One of these departures concerns the question of whether Israeli military facilities of any kind can remain within a Palestinian state at least for a transitional stage after the implementation of an agreement. In the Clinton parameters, there was an understanding that three Israeli facilities––essentially early warning stations manned by a relative few individuals––would and could remain. But on Thursday the President spoke of complete Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, and he did not mention any such facilities. This was clearly a tilting in the Palestinian direction. Even more dramatic, but again virtually ignored since Thursday because of the 1967 lines nonsense, the President proposed separating the four standard issues presumed to be engaged in a final settlement: borders, security, Jerusalem, and refugees. The idea expressed on Thursday was to hammer out a deal on borders and security, and leave Jerusalem and refugees for later in the hopes that by compartmentalizing the problems they would be easier to solve.

It is not particular surprising to see this idea in the President's speech. It is a notion propagated in a book not long ago co-authored by David Makovsky and Dennis Ross. Dennis Ross is, as I think everyone knows, an employee of the U.S. government right now, yet again. In point of fact, he is the President's key official on this area of the world in the National Security Council. If anything, his influence has risen lately with the resignation of Middle East special envoy George Mitchell. It is not surprising, as I said, to see this idea in the speech, but that doesn't mean that it's a good idea. It might be, but I am not persuaded that it is. From the Israeli point of view, the refugee issue is very difficult to separate from security. I do not think any Israeli government can afford to negotiate a deal over borders and security without an understanding about refugees, because any deal over borders and security can be undone de facto by Palestinian insistence on the "right of return." That doesn't mean they would get their way on such an insistence, but an inability to close the deal over the last two issues––Jerusalem and refugees––means that the negotiation can't get to the end-of-conflict stage, which from the Israeli point of view is really the main point of the whole effort. Israelis are willing to trade real assets, real land, and even to take some risks on security issues if the payoff is a genuine and binding commitment to end the conflict. To give over real assets for anything short of that, I think, most Israeli governments that I can imagine would demur. And who could blame them?

So it is fair to say, perhaps, that taken as a whole the President's remarks on Thursday tilted toward the Palestinians. And a lot of people have remarked that, in the aftermath of Fatah's agreement to join a unity arrangement with Hamas, still unreconciled to Israel's existence, such a tilt amounts to rewarding bad behavior. I agree with this, as I have said before. But that's not the same as accusing the President of introducing pro-Palestinian novelty on the question of borders.

Now, on an even finer point of interpretation, some have said that that President Obama in effect had earlier repudiated the Bush statement of April 2004. That led some to read into his remarks on Thursday more than was literally there, but which might be a fair interpretation in light of context. There is some weight in this argument, and it is important, too, to understand that for one President to repudiate a solemn promise given by a predecessor sets a very bad precedent. It devalues the word of the President of the United States, not the man but the office. Who will believe a presidential promise in future if prior promises can be so easily removed from play? Some have suggested, therefore, that President Obama needs to explicitly reinstate the essence of the April 2004 statement. That is probably too much to ask at the present time. I still think, however, that the President's words, as stated on Thursday and as clarified and repeated on Sunday, mark no literal change of U.S. policy.

Nicholas Carr wrote a book a little while ago called The Shallows. The book is about IT technology and the effects it may be having on our cognitive processing abilities. Many people wonder whether attention spans are being shortened by the nature of the technology, whether time-honored rules of evidence are being smothered by the rapid-fire shoot-from-the-hip subculture of the blogosphere, whether there is a tendency to equate information with knowledge in a situation in which so many people have no context to interpret information, and really--what it all comes down to -- whether a genuine lack of seriousness now pervades our political discourse. I confess to some concern about all this, but coming up with actual evidence isn't easy. But when I behold the almost unbelievable outpouring of ignorance and sheer nonsense over what the President said last Thursday, I think I am as close to evidence as I am likely soon to get that our political culture has stopped being even remotely serious. Never before in my life have I witnessed anything quite like this, where facts and common sense have been so rapidly and thoroughly been tossed out the window in favor of cant, spin, venom and a whole wheelbarrow full of dogshit dumb stupidity.

As I noted a moment ago, is not only President Obama's Sunday night speech to AIPAC that forms the context of the current craziness, but also what Prime Minister Netanyahu had to say to Congress. As speeches go, Netanyahu's speech was very good. It was quite well-crafted. And in the speech, as everyone knows, Netanyahu objected to any use of the 1967 lines as the basis for anything. If one did not understand the history of what the President said in the first place, one could get the impression that Netanyahu was taking issue with something new, something that just been introduced on Thursday. That, apparently, is what most people think. But this is not the case. Netanyahu and his Likud Party have never accepted, never been in accord with, U.S. policy on the question of borders going all the way back to 1967.

The Likud has in fact come a long way from its views a quarter-century ago, when it was still dedicated to what in Hebrew transliterated as eretz yisrael shleyma, the greater Land of Israel, or better translated, the whole or complete land of Israel. In this original Likud view, which dates back to the party's founder, Vladimir Jabotinsky, all of what became the West Bank in 1948–49 really belongs to Israel, and that if there is to be a Palestinian state that state already exists in what is called Jordan. This theory is based on a misinterpretation, actually a willfulness interpretation, of the history of the Palestine mandate, the Churchill White paper, and the nature of the Mandate itself. (We don't have time here to go into all this; I have done it before and if anybody is interested they can let me know and I can pass along the relevant materials.) Back at its ideological peak, so to speak, the Likud view was that no land west of the Jordan River should pass back into the hands of any Arab sovereignty, and some Likud proponents argued that the way to truly secure the land west of the river for Israel was to expel or in other ways incentivize the departure of the Arabs who live there.

As I say, today's Likud Party is a long way from this view. Indeed, a Likud Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, offered Mahmud Abbas a peace deal in 2008 not all that different from the one Barak had put to Yasir Arafat in the summer of 2000. This would've been inconceivable twenty years earlier. Nevertheless, as anyone familiar with the history of the Likud Party knows, it has never excepted the standard Israeli Labour Party or U.S. interpretation of resolution 242 and it still does not.

Now it is interesting to note that because of the confusion that has arisen over what Netanyahu was talking about, and the spun misinterpretation of Obama's statement in the first place, it now looks like Netanyahu has the support of Congress, including even many prominent Democrats, against something the President presumably he tried to introduce as new policy. Since, as I have shown, Obama intended no such thing, it will be easy now to characterize his view as one that has been backed down, when he has done nothing of the sort.

Strange as it may seem, the argument between Obama and Netanyahu, real as it is––though it has nothing to do with any attempted U.S. policy innovation concerning the 1967 lines––actually helps both men in a way. It certainly helps Netanyahu, who can now pose as having outflanked the President of the United States in his own legislature and thus strengthen his coalition and burnish his popularity at home. In a way, all of this helps Obama because, even though it isn't true, to those who believe in the almost mystical power of the Jewish lobby, he appears to be brave, besieged, abused, and hence altogether lovable to those prone to exalt victims of all sorts. He is a political martyr, though in this case without actually having done anything fatal.


In the longer run, however, this argument doesn't really help either person or their constituencies. It is not a good thing when Israeli Prime Ministers try to insinuate themselves into American domestic political affairs. The last time this happened was in the mid-1980s when Itzhak Shamir tried his hand at a similar ploy, and it backfired badly. Politicians may not know a lot about the facts in an area like the Middle East or the Arab-Israeli conflict, but they have very long memories when it comes to political combat. Those whom Netanyahu may get the better of now will bide their time and look for a way to exact revenge. But it won't be revenge against Netanyahu––it will be revenge against Israel. Nor is President Obama really helped by any of this. It is not as though he can easily translate the sentiment of conspiracy theorists at home and abroad into anything useful either with regard to his own political ambitions or the foreign policy interests of United States.

Well, in conclusion, the trouble the President has gotten himself into, unfair as it is, is nonetheless his own fault. He should not have spoken about Israel/Palestine issues in Thursday's speech––he should've saved all that for Sunday at AIPAC. The real error he made, however, is one he seems to make all the time: He tries to split the difference when he cannot make up his mind on a point and when his advisers disagree with each other over it. So in this case there were some people in the administration close to the President who advised him to lay out a detailed U.S. plan for Arab-Israeli peace, and there were others who tried to warn him not to do this at a time when prospects for progress are so unavailing. So what did he do? He split the difference. He laid out some general parameters, but they fell far short of a detailed U.S. blueprint. He would have been better off not being the master of the half measure in this case, but rather of either having shut up or of having gone full bore.

It is an interesting practical and philosophical enterprise to examine the question of when half measures, or incremental approaches, to put it more formally, makes sense in political life and when they do not. There are certain structural aspects of problems that seem to mitigate either for or against the success of incremental approaches. But this is a very complicated and difficult question, not one to be explored in depth in a mere blog post. The point here is that President Obama is by his nature diffident when it comes to all questions except those he has really thought through. This tendency to split the difference identifies him, as I have argued before, as having the personality not of a professor––as so many have claimed––but rather the personality of a judge. That kind of approach can work in American politics, or at least it used to be able to work. But it does not work well as an approach to diplomacy. In diplomacy most of the time, including the diplomacy of war, as in the Libya case, the last thing a President should want to do is get himself and the country stuck in the hell of half measures. That's the specific precinct of hell the President got himself into this time. Let's see how he tries to get himself out.






Monday, May 23, 2011

79 Notes

As I have done on a few occasions before, I comment here on President Obama’s speech of May 19 by annotating his text. I do this by attaching footnotes to those passages on which I wish to comment. On some media, these notes show up best in this electronic medium simply by placing your cursor on the footnote number. That doesn't work here, so you have to go back and forth to concord the text with the note. Sorry; it should work better than this, but it doesn't. Maybe printing it will make it easier to read as intended--not sure.

Anyway, as in the past when I have used this method, I comment on the art of speechwriting as well as the substance of the speech. Sometimes it is possible to keep those tasks separate, but in this speech I find that they tend to blur more than usual because the sloppy use, or curious use, of language elides more than usual on matters of substance. As you might guess from this hint, I did not think that the speech was very good.

There are at least three levels on which one can comment on a presidential speech, or any high-level political speech. The first concerns its big idea, its grand theme—the new and valuable conceptual innovation that gives the speech its purpose. The second level one might call structural—namely, how the speaker, along of course with the listener, gets from beginning to middle to end without losing the logical and emotional flow. And the third level is the more discreet use of language, the sentence-by-sentence and phrase-by-phrase crafting of the language. All three of these levels combine, when they are executed properly, to produce a high-quality speech. If any one of them is messed up, the speech will suffer. If all three are substandard, as is the case here, a disservice to the office will have been done.

Before beginning my annotation, let me talk generally about this speech to try to set out a context for my more specific comments.

The elite press has been buzzing for a week or so that the Administration has been searching for some grand narrative to accomplish a “reset” for the Middle East. There have been New York Times articles, Washington Post articles and other usual suspects who have allowed themselves to be spun by their White House sources. This is par for the course––no big surprise. At least according to these accounts, the President was seeking some way to connect the upheavals of what is generically called the Arab Spring with both the so-called peace process and the epochal events that took place in Abbottabbad on May 2. Personally, I think the choice of the word “reset” was unfortunate. It assumes that the original use of the term, in relation to policy toward Russia, has been a grand success, and I would disagree with that assessment.

But it is not clear to me still why the search for a synoptic understanding of the region has to be the occasion for a presidential speech. I am all for synoptic understandings and for strategic thinking, and if the prospect of the President giving a speech is the only thing that can get this Administration to seek that understanding and do that thinking, then I’m all for it. But of course that is silly. Intelligent leaders do not say everything they think, and high-level government assessments of important developments are not meant to be pondered in public.

This speech, however, comes across precisely as a form of thinking out loud. It contains no grand narrative except, I suppose, for the very general and generic idea that the United States now supports democratic change in the Arab and Muslim worlds. But that is nothing even remotely new, and the “new” policy is not described in any particularly noteworthy way. Moreover, the speech does not link Arab political upheaval, peace process dilemmas and the war on terror in any novel or interesting way either.

The peace process content of the speech comes only at the very end and looks like a tag on. In my view, aside from being awkward in terms of structure, the fact that it is there at all detracts from what the President was really trying to say which, as best I can make out, is that the citizens, the people, of individual Arab states are now taking their destiny into their own hands and that this is on balance a good thing that the United States will support. Since the obsession with Israel has been a chronic distraction from that potentially healthy process, as the President himself noted in one of the speech’s best passages, why is he referring to it? Moreover, as was known before he delivered the speech, he was going to address the AIPAC yearly conference on Sunday, which is a natural occasion to talk about Israel/Palestine and peace process issues. At this point one had to wonder what he would say on Sunday that could be any different from what he said yesterday. And indeed, what he said on Sunday did not differ in any significant way on this point from what he said on Thursday. (More on this matter below.)

I should not be too critical of the President on this point, however, because there were many things he might have said and didn't say that I'm very glad he did not say about the supposed relationship among these three topics. At the beginning of his Administration, both he and his national security advisor and several others around him were of the view that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the be-all and end-all, the central node, of all problems in the region from political and economic development to the danger of terrorism. At least he did not repeat this erroneous statement about the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nor did he repeat his demand that all Israeli settlement activity stop as a precondition for negotiations. Sometimes what is not said is more important than what is.

Nevertheless, the lack of any novelty or creativity in expressing U.S. support for liberal reform leaves the speech sort of loosely hanging in the air. In the very second paragraph of the speech the President refers to “a new chapter” in American diplomacy, begging the question of what the title to that new chapter is or should be. After reading the speech twice and listening to it I still cannot figure out what that chapter title is or might be. The speech offers no take-away line that sums up its essence. There are no nuggets of language, no novel formulations, no insightful typological heuristics to be found anywhere in this long speech.

In short, in my view, the speech was not ready for prime time. It should not have been delivered because it was not finished. It strikes me as a passable first or maybe second draft, but no more than that. As I will demonstrate below, its rough edges are multitudinous.

But of course the speech had been announced, and it is rather embarrassing to cancel a presidential speech after one has been announced. Word to the wise then: Better to finish the assignment before promising the venue. The President of United States can always get an audience. He does not need to announce many days beforehand that he is going to give a speech; he can just do it when he feels ready to do it and, believe me, people will pay attention.

It is important not to give a speech of this kind before its time, and I frankly don't see what the rush was. The upheavals in the Arab world are ongoing and they will continue going for many weeks and months ahead. If this target is to warn the Palestinians and their supporters off from declaring an independent state at United Nations in September, a plausible target, he had plenty of time to do that and he could’ve done that in a separate speech dealing with Israel/Palestine matters––like the one he gave on Sunday. The May 19 speed could have been delivered at any time over the next several weeks or months. Presidential speeches are not free. They represent a spending of political capital. They raise expectations and mobilize constituencies. So if you are not sure as President that a speech is going to stick to the wall, that it’s going to leave the impression and do the job you intend, it is better not to give it. A speech that doesn’t work is a wasted opportunity, and this is one of them.

Finally, by way of prolegomenon, I find myself forced to speculate about two related and very key questions. Before any speech of this nature is drafted, the principal needs to define the purpose of the speech and the key audience or audiences to which it is being addressed. If you do not know those two things, you are not ready to begin. So when I reverse engineer this speech, as delivered and as it reads, I wonder how those questions were answered. The timing of the speech, late morning, suggests that perhaps the audience in the main is the Arabs. When the President spoke it was late afternoon in the region, perfect timing to get on all the evening news shows in that part of the world. But which Arabs? Did the President mean to address the mobilized pro-democracy or at any rate anti-status quo demonstrators, those with the Facebook accounts and twitter habits? Was he also trying to address the palaces in the region, like that of the Al-Khalifa in Bahrain? If so, what was his purpose in doing so? Was it to get that first constituency to believe that the United States was basically on its side? Was it to actually persuade the leaders of Bahrain to change policy?

Since I was obviously not part of the process that led to the speech, I don’t know the answers to these questions. All I can say is that perhaps young Arabs in Cairo and in the cities of Syria and in the eastern parts of Libya will be cheered by what the President had to say. He has had the reputation, exaggerated in my view, of being a heartless realist for most of his two years in office. But even if this is so, and young middle class protesters across the region now think the United States is their friend (highly unlikely), exactly how is that going to help them? And what if they suspect or hope that somehow, sub rosa, we are going to help them and then we don't in any practical way? I have difficulty connecting the dots here, between the sentiment expressed and its real world consequences in the present tumultuous context.

Otherwise, for any practical purpose, I don't see how the speech helps United States at all on the state to state level where policy actually happens. Where things really count, which is to say in the palaces of the Middle East, and by that I mean the upper echelons of leadership in both monarchical and republican states, he has not done himself any favors. He certainly has not endeared himself to the Syrian leadership, to which for the first time he has gotten verbally tough, saying change or leave. But, then again, those words were long overdue, and so have lost a good deal of their impact in the delay. But he has not endeared himself to many of the United States’ most useful associates, and here one must include not only Bahrain, which the President mentioned, but also Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait. It's a fair bet that the President has pissed off all of these leaderships, who were anyway none too happy with him over American policy toward Bahrain. Some of these countries have been more helpful than others over the years, and here I note especially the UAE.

I think the worst consequence of the speech concerns Egypt. The speech treats Egypt as though it is already a successful democracy. It is rewarding Egypt with debt forgiveness and discussing all sorts of ways to improve the Egyptian economy as if, again, the main drama in Egypt is over and only details are yet to be worked out. I think this is quite mistaken. Egypt at present has a transitional military government, which differs only from its longtime regime structure, a military government, in its personnel roster and in the fact that in the current situation military officers are wearing their uniforms, whereas in the previous epoch they did not. That isn't much of a difference. Note too that Egypt's constitutional referendum of several weeks back suggested that the military is being very cautious about how it builds Egypt's new political economy. We do not know yet what sort of election Egypt may have in September – – whether it will be constrained or fair, whether the vote count will be honest or fraudulent, or what sort of deals the Army will insist upon before it lets candidates run for high office. To assume in public in the name of the President of the United States that Egypt is already a certified member of the democratic community is to give transitional junta a free pass come September. I just don't see that this is a wise thing to have done.

Nor has the President necessarily helped himself with either Israelis or Palestinians, neither of which trusts the man anyway after the mess he and he and his Administration made with the peace process during the Administration’s first year. The general language the President used in speaking to Israel and to the Palestinian Authority was quite crisp, strong and right. All that he said is true. But just because something is true doesn't mean it's wise to say it. When you look into the details, beyond the general rhetoric, there is plenty for both sides to intensely dislike. From the Israeli point of view, there is a case to be made that the specifics the President mentioned lean away at least a little from the Clinton parameters in favor of the Palestinian position. I will discuss this in detail below. From the Palestinian point of view, the very direct statements about Israel's legitimacy and right to exist are sure to inflame the souls of Palestinian zealots. The President warned directly against trying to use the United Nations and other external organizations to pressure Israel, implying strongly that the United States would veto any such attempts. He offered nothing new to help either side, however. The result is that, most likely, both this Israeli government and the PA leadership are pissed off even more than they were before the President spoke. And of course, just in passing, he pissed off the Yemeni leadership, the Iranian leadership and, at least by indirection in criticizing the Arab monarchies, also two reasonably close allies – – Jordan and Morocco—who have recently been invited to join the GCC.

Now, there have been some quick commentaries on the speech, out on the Internet within minutes, it seemed, after the President finished his remarks, claiming that he is channeling George W. Bush and that he is for all practical purposes a neocon. Just as President Obama's reputation as a hardhearted realist was exaggerated before, I think these interpretations are exaggerated now. Alas, as the President illustrated in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, he is Mr. Half Measure. He cannot decide between the two magnetic poles of the desirable and the necessary. I think the speech illustrates that same characteristic. The events of the day have forced him, in this case, to lean to one side, but there are several elements in the speech – – I will point them out below – – that show that he is still attempting a balancing act.

I think that is normal and actually heartening. The idea that democracy promotion, for example, did not exist in US foreign policy before George W. Bush is silly. The idea that the second George W. Bush Administration repudiated the idealism of the first is a vast exaggeration of reality. (Condoleezza Rice is often blamed for this, the presumption being that she somehow transformed from being the President’s most trusted and hard-line adviser when she was National Security Advisor to being a mere shell of herself, captured by the relentless pull of Department of State weenie-ism.) The idea that democracy promotion in terms of actual programs and budget had been completely eliminated during the first two years of the Obama administration is also silly. Both of these elements of American policy are always present, even if the rhetoric of the moment seems to elevate one at the expense of the other.

It sometimes strikes me that only those who have never been in government could possibly see this as an either/or choice. Now, if I thought that the President's remarks on Thursday were the harbinger of the second coming of “the forward strategy for freedom”, I would be worried. I am worried a little, I admit. But Barack Obama is not, at least in foreign policy, the kind of ideological thinker that George W. Bush was. And the deliverables in the speech were far too underwhelming to be scary in any way at all. So I am reserving judgment.

Of course it is wise for the United States to say, and to mean, that it supports the expansion of freedom and liberty in the world – – regrettably in the speech the term “self-determination” is used, of which more below. It is also wise to then go in private to the leaders of the UAE and say something to the effect, “Now don't get excited; we had to say this and you know why; it doesn't mean we don't still love you.” So I do not necessarily think that the speech means that the United States has now chosen to have bad relations with at least ten useful countries in the region. At least I hope that's not what it means, certainly in a situation where our insinuation that they should change or leave drops into a context in which we have no means to ensure that what might follow them would be any better either for their own people or for U.S. interests.

Some have suggested that politics, that is to say American domestic politics, constitutes the real purpose of the speech. It has to do, some claim, with the start of his 2012 reelection campaign. That is not difficult to believe given how political this President is, but looking at the text of the speech it’s far from obvious how it helps the President politically. As I will note further below, what he had to say about Israel/Palestine may end up hurting him with American Jews, as Republicans try to interpret the speech far beyond its actual content. Many American Jews have already been made uneasy by his policies, so even distorted interpretations may affect them. He cannot have gained very much more by talking about bin Laden's death; that is already a wasting political asset.

In short, I am not sure what the purpose of the speech was, or what the main audience was intended to be. I suppose one might claim that the speech had as its main purpose to announce the deliverables within it, namely debt forgiveness for Egypt, sanctions on the Syrian leadership already announced the day before, and the other programs the President mentioned. This is not a very persuasive possibility, however, because those deliverables could have been announced in all sorts of ways. A presidential speech has to do more than that, and this one did not. At the very least, a presidential speech must do no harm. It is not even clear to me that this speech gets over even that rather low bar.

* * *

I want to thank Hillary Clinton, who has traveled so much these last six months that she is approaching a new landmark – one million frequent flyer miles. I count on Hillary every day, and I believe that she will go down as of the finest Secretaries of State in our nation's history.[1]

The State Department is a fitting venue to mark a new chapter in American diplomacy.[2] For six months, we have witnessed an extraordinary change take place in the Middle East and North Africa. Square by square; town by town; country by country; the people have risen up to demand their basic human rights.[3] Two leaders have stepped aside. More may follow. And though these countries may be a great distance from our shores, we know that our own future is bound to this region by the forces of economics and security; history and faith.[4]

Today, I would like to talk about this change – the forces that are driving it, and how we can respond in a way that advances our values and strengthens our security.[5] Already, we have done much to shift our foreign policy following a decade defined by two costly conflicts. After years of war in Iraq, we have removed 100,000 American troops and ended our combat mission there.[6] In Afghanistan, we have broken the Taliban's momentum[7], and this July we will begin to bring our troops home and continue a transition to Afghan lead.[8] And after years of war against al Qaeda and its affiliates, we have dealt al Qaeda a huge blow[9] by killing its leader – Osama bin Laden.

Bin Laden was no martyr.[10] He was a mass murderer who offered a message of hate – an insistence that Muslims had to take up arms against the West, and that violence against men, women and children was the only path to change. He rejected democracy and individual rights for Muslims in favor of violent extremism[11]; his agenda focused on what he could destroy – not what he could build.[12]

Bin Laden and his murderous vision won some adherents. But even before his death, al Qaeda was losing its struggle for relevance, as the overwhelming majority of people saw that the slaughter of innocents did not answer their cries for a better life. By the time we found bin Laden, al Qaeda's agenda had come to be seen by the vast majority of the region as a dead end, and the people of the Middle East and North Africa had taken their future into their own hands.[13]

That story of self-determination began six months ago in Tunisia. On December 17, a young vendor named Mohammed Bouazizi was devastated when a police officer confiscated his cart. This was not unique. It is the same kind of humiliation that takes place every day in many parts of the world – the relentless tyranny of governments that deny their citizens dignity.[14] Only this time, something different happened. After local officials refused to hear his complaint, this young man who had never been particularly active in politics went to the headquarters of the provincial government, doused himself in fuel, and lit himself on fire.

Sometimes, in the course of history, the actions of ordinary citizens spark movements for change because they speak to a longing for freedom that has built up for years. In America, think of the defiance of those patriots in Boston who refused to pay taxes to a King,[15] or the dignity of Rosa Parks as she sat courageously in her seat. So it was in Tunisia, as that vendor's act of desperation tapped into the frustration felt throughout the country. Hundreds of protesters took to the streets, then thousands. And in the face of batons and sometimes bullets, they refused to go home – day after day, week after week, until a dictator of more than two decades finally left power.

The story of this Revolution, and the ones that followed, should not have come as a surprise. The nations of the Middle East and North Africa won[16] their independence long ago, but in too many places their people did not. In too many countries, power has been concentrated in the hands of the few.[17] In too many countries, a citizen like that young vendor had nowhere to turn – no honest judiciary to hear his case; no independent media to give him voice; no credible political party to represent his views; no free and fair election where he could choose his leader.

This lack of self determination – the chance to make of your life what you will – has applied to the region's economy as well.[18] Yes, some nations are blessed with wealth in oil and gas, and that has led to pockets of prosperity. But in a global economy based on knowledge and innovation, no development strategy can be based solely upon what comes out of the ground.[19] Nor can people reach their potential when you cannot start a business without paying a bribe.

In the face of these challenges, too many leaders in the region tried to direct their people's grievances elsewhere. The West was blamed as the source of all ills, a half century after the end of colonialism. Antagonism toward Israel became the only acceptable outlet for political expression. Divisions of tribe, ethnicity and religious sect were manipulated as a means of holding on to power, or taking it away from somebody else.[20]

But the events of the past six months show us that strategies of repression and diversion won't work anymore. Satellite television and the Internet provide a window into the wider world – a world of astonishing progress in places like India, Indonesia and Brazil. Cell phones and social networks allow young people to connect and organize like never before. A new generation has emerged. And their voices tell us that change cannot be denied.[21]

In Cairo, we heard the voice of the young mother who said, "It's like I can finally breathe fresh air for the first time."

In Sanaa, we heard the students who chanted, "The night must come to an end."

In Benghazi, we heard the engineer who said, "Our words are free now. It's a feeling you can't explain."

In Damascus, we heard the young man who said, "After the first yelling, the first shout, you feel dignity."[22]

Those shouts of human dignity are being heard across the region. And through the moral force of non-violence, the people of the region have achieved more change in six months than terrorists have accomplished in decades.[23]

Of course, change of this magnitude does not come easily. In our day and age – a time of 24 hour news cycles, and constant communication – people expect the transformation of the region to be resolved in a matter of weeks. But it will be years before this story reaches its end. Along the way, there will be good days, and bad days. In some places, change will be swift; in others, gradual. And as we have seen, calls for change may give way to fierce contests for power.[24]

The question before us is what role America will play as this story unfolds. For decades, the United States has pursued a set of core interests in the region: countering terrorism and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons; securing the free flow of commerce, and safe-guarding the security of the region; standing up for Israel's security and pursuing Arab-Israeli peace.[25]

We will continue to do these things, with the firm belief that America's interests are not hostile to peoples' hopes; they are essential to them. We believe that no one benefits from a nuclear arms race in the region, or al Qaeda's brutal attacks. People everywhere would see their economies crippled by a cut off in energy supplies.[26] As we did in the Gulf War, we will not tolerate aggression across borders, and we will keep our commitments to friends and partners.

Yet we must acknowledge that a strategy based solely upon the narrow pursuit of these interests will not fill an empty stomach or allow someone to speak their mind.[27] Moreover, failure to speak to the broader aspirations of ordinary people[28] will only feed the suspicion that has festered for years that the United States pursues our own interests at their expense. Given that this mistrust runs both ways – as Americans have been seared by hostage taking, violent rhetoric, and terrorist attacks that have killed thousands of our citizens – a failure to change our approach threatens a deepening spiral of division between the United States and Muslim communities.[29]

That's why, two years ago in Cairo, I began to broaden our engagement based upon mutual interests and mutual respect. I believed then – and I believe now – that we have a stake not just in the stability of nations, but in the self determination of individuals.[30] The status quo is not sustainable. Societies held together by fear and repression may offer the illusion of stability for a time, but they are built upon fault lines that will eventually tear asunder.[31]

So we face an historic opportunity. We have embraced the chance to show that America values the dignity of the street vendor in Tunisia more than the raw power of the dictator. There must be no doubt that the United States of America welcomes change that advances self-determination and opportunity. Yes, there will be perils that accompany this moment of promise. But after decades of accepting the world as it is in the region, we have a chance to pursue the world as it should be.[32]

As we do, we must proceed with a sense of humility. It is not America that put people into the streets of Tunis and Cairo – it was the people themselves who launched these movements, and must determine their outcome. Not every country will follow our particular form of representative democracy, and there will be times when our short term interests do not align perfectly with our long term vision of the region.[33] But we can – and will – speak out for a set of core principles – principles that have guided our response to the events over the past six months:

The United States opposes the use of violence and repression against the people of the region.[34]

We support a set of universal rights. Those rights include free speech; the freedom of peaceful assembly; freedom of religion; equality for men and women under the rule of law; and the right to choose your own leaders – whether you live in Baghdad or Damascus; Sanaa or Tehran.[35]

And finally, we support political and economic reform in the Middle East and North Africa that can meet the legitimate aspirations of ordinary people throughout the region.

Our support for these principles is not a secondary interest– today I am making it clear that it is a top priority that must be translated into concrete actions, and supported by all of the diplomatic, economic and strategic tools at our disposal.[36]

Let me be specific. First, it will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy.

That effort begins in Egypt and Tunisia, where the stakes are high –as Tunisia was at the vanguard of this democratic wave, and Egypt is both a longstanding partner and the Arab World's largest nation. Both nations can set a strong example through free and fair elections; a vibrant civil society; accountable and effective democratic institutions; and responsible regional leadership. But our support must also extend to nations where transitions have yet to take place.

Unfortunately, in too many countries, calls for change have been answered by violence. The most extreme example is Libya, where Moammar Gaddafi launched a war against his people, promising to hunt them down like rats. As I said when the United States joined an international coalition to intervene, we cannot prevent every injustice perpetrated by a regime against its people, and we have learned from our experience in Iraq just how costly and difficult it is to impose regime change by force – no matter how well-intended it may be.

But in Libya, we saw the prospect of imminent massacre, had a mandate for action, and heard the Libyan people's call for help. Had we not acted along with our NATO allies and regional coalition partners, thousands would have been killed.[37] The message would have been clear: keep power by killing as many people as it takes.[38] Now, time is working against Gaddafi.[39] He does not have control over his country. The opposition has organized a legitimate and credible Interim Council. And when Gaddafi inevitably leaves or is forced from power, decades of provocation will come to an end, and the transition to a democratic Libya can proceed.

While Libya has faced violence on the greatest scale, it is not the only place where leaders have turned to repression to remain in power. Most recently, the Syrian regime has chosen the path of murder and the mass arrests of its citizens. The United States has condemned these actions, and working with the international community we have stepped up our sanctions on the Syrian regime – including sanctions announced yesterday on President Assad and those around him.[40]

The Syrian people have shown their courage in demanding a transition to democracy.[41] President Assad now has a choice: he can lead that transition, or get out of the way. The Syrian government must stop shooting demonstrators and allow peaceful protests; release political prisoners and stop unjust arrests; allow human rights monitors to have access to cities like Dara'a; and start a serious dialogue to advance a democratic transition. Otherwise, President Assad and his regime will continue to be challenged from within and isolated abroad.[42]

Thus far, Syria has followed its Iranian ally, seeking assistance from Tehran in the tactics of suppression. This speaks to the hypocrisy of the Iranian regime, which says it stand for the rights of protesters abroad, yet suppresses its people at home.[43] Let us remember that the first peaceful protests were in the streets of Tehran, where the government brutalized women and men, and threw innocent people into jail. We still hear the chants echo from the rooftops of Tehran. The image of a young woman dying in the streets is still seared in our memory.[44] And we will continue to insist that the Iranian people deserve their universal rights[45], and a government that does not smother their aspirations.

Our opposition to Iran's intolerance – as well as its illicit nuclear program, and its sponsorship of terror – is well known. But if America is to be credible, we must acknowledge that our friends in the region have not all reacted to the demands for change consistent with the principles that I have outlined today. That is true in Yemen, where President Saleh needs to follow through on his commitment to transfer power. And that is true, today, in Bahrain.

Bahrain is a long-standing partner, and we are committed to its security. We recognize that Iran has tried to take advantage of the turmoil there, and that the Bahraini government has a legitimate interest in the rule of law. Nevertheless, we have insisted publically and privately that mass arrests and brute force are at odds with the universal[46] rights of Bahrain's citizens, and will not make legitimate calls for reform go away. The only way forward is for the government and opposition to engage in a dialogue, and you can't have a real dialogue when parts of the peaceful opposition are in jail. The government must create the conditions for dialogue, and the opposition must participate to forge a just future for all Bahrainis.[47]

Indeed, one of the broader lessons to be drawn from this period is that sectarian divides need not lead to conflict. In Iraq, we see the promise of a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian democracy. There, the Iraqi people have rejected the perils of political violence for a democratic process, even as they have taken full responsibility for their own security. Like all new democracies, they will face setbacks. But Iraq is poised to play a key role in the region if it continues its peaceful progress. As they do[48], we will be proud to stand with them as a steadfast partner.[49]

So in the months ahead, America must use all our[50] influence to encourage reform in the region. Even as we acknowledge that each country is different, we will need to speak honestly about the principles that we believe in, with friend and foe alike. Our message is simple: if you take the risks that reform entails, you will have the full support of the United States. We must also build on our efforts to broaden our engagement beyond elites, so that we reach the people who will shape the future – particularly young people.

We will continue to make good on the commitments that I made in Cairo – to build networks of entrepreneurs, and expand exchanges in education; to foster cooperation in science and technology, and combat disease. Across the region, we intend to provide assistance to civil society, including those that may not be officially sanctioned, and who speak uncomfortable truths. And we will use the technology to connect with – and listen to – the voices of the people.

In fact, real reform will not come at the ballot box alone. Through our efforts we must support those basic rights to speak your mind and access information. We will support open access to the Internet, and the right of journalists to be heard – whether it's a big news organization or a blogger. In the 21st century, information is power; the truth cannot be hidden; and the legitimacy of governments will ultimately depend on active and informed citizens.[51]

Such open discourse is important even if what is said does not square with our worldview. America respects the right of all peaceful and law-abiding voices to be heard, even if we disagree with them. We look forward to working with all who embrace genuine and inclusive democracy. What we will oppose is an attempt by any group to restrict the rights of others, and to hold power through coercion – not consent. Because democracy depends not only on elections, but also strong and accountable institutions, and respect for the rights of minorities.

Such tolerance is particularly important when it comes to religion. In Tahrir Square, we heard Egyptians from all walks of life chant, "Muslims, Christians, we are one." America will work to see that this spirit prevails – that all faiths are respected, and that bridges are built among them. In a region that was[52] the birthplace of three world religions, intolerance can lead only to suffering and stagnation. And for this season of change to succeed, Coptic Christians must have the right to worship freely in Cairo, just as Shia must never have their mosques destroyed in Bahrain.

What is true for religious minorities is also true when it comes to the rights of women. History shows that countries are more prosperous and peaceful when women are empowered. That is why we will continue to insist that universal rights apply to women as well as men – by focusing assistance on child and maternal health; by helping women to teach, or start a business; by standing up for the right of women to have their voices heard, and to run for office. For the region will never reach its potential when more than half its population is prevented from achieving their potential.[53]

Even as we promote political reform and human rights in the region, our efforts cannot stop there. So the second way that we must support positive change in the region is through our efforts to advance economic development for nations that transition to democracy.

After all, politics alone has not put protesters into the streets. The tipping point for so many people is the more constant concern of putting food on the table and providing for a family. Too many in the region wake up with few expectations other than making it through the day, and perhaps the hope that their luck will change. Throughout the region, many young people have a solid education, but closed economies leave them unable to find a job. Entrepreneurs are brimming with ideas, but corruption leaves them unable to profit from them.[54]

The greatest untapped resource in the Middle East and North Africa is the talent of its people. In the recent protests, we see that talent on display, as people harness technology to move the world. It's no coincidence that one of the leaders of Tahrir Square was an executive for Google. That energy now needs to be channeled, in country after country, so that economic growth can solidify the accomplishments of the street. Just as democratic revolutions can be triggered by a lack of individual opportunity, successful democratic transitions depend upon an expansion of growth[55] and broad-based prosperity.[56]

Drawing from what we've learned around the world, we think it's important to focus on trade, not just aid; and investment, not just assistance.[57] The goal must be a model in which protectionism gives way to openness[58]; the reigns of commerce pass from the few to the many, and the economy generates jobs for the young. America's support for democracy will therefore be based on ensuring financial stability; promoting reform; and integrating competitive markets with each other and the global economy – starting with Tunisia and Egypt.

First, we have asked the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to present a plan at next week's G-8 summit for what needs to be done to stabilize and modernize the economies of Tunisia and Egypt. Together, we must help them recover from the disruption of their democratic upheaval, and support the governments that will be elected later this year.[59] And we are urging other countries to help Egypt and Tunisia meet its near-term financial needs.

Second, we do not want a democratic Egypt to be saddled by the debts of its past. So we will relieve a democratic Egypt of up to $1 billion in debt, and work with our Egyptian partners to invest these resources to foster growth and entrepreneurship. We will help Egypt regain access to markets by guaranteeing $1 billion in borrowing that is needed to finance infrastructure and job creation. And we will help newly democratic governments recover assets that were stolen.

Third, we are working with Congress to create Enterprise Funds to invest in Tunisia and Egypt. These will be modeled on funds that supported the transitions in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. OPIC will soon launch a $2 billion facility to support private investment across the region. And we will work with allies to refocus the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development so that it provides the same support for democratic transitions and economic modernization in the Middle East and North Africa as it has in Europe.[60]

Fourth, the United States will launch a comprehensive Trade and Investment Partnership Initiative in the Middle East and North Africa. If you take out oil exports, this region of over 400 million people exports roughly the same amount as Switzerland. So we will work with the EU to facilitate more trade within the region, build on existing agreements to promote integration with U.S. and European markets, and open the door for those countries who adopt high standards of reform and trade liberalization to construct a regional trade arrangement. Just as EU membership served as an incentive for reform in Europe, so should the vision of a modern and prosperous economy create a powerful force for reform in the Middle East and North Africa.[61]

Prosperity also requires tearing down walls that stand in the way of progress – the corruption of elites who steal from their people; the red tape that stops an idea from becoming a business; the patronage that distributes wealth based on tribe or sect. We will help governments meet international obligations, and invest efforts anti-corruption; by working with parliamentarians who are developing reforms, and activists who use technology to hold government accountable.

Let me conclude by talking about another cornerstone of our approach to the region, and that relates to the pursuit of peace.[62]

For decades, the conflict between Israelis and Arabs has cast a shadow over the region. For Israelis, it has meant living with the fear that their children could get blown up on a bus or by rockets fired at their homes, as well as the pain of knowing that other children in the region are taught to hate them. For Palestinians, it has meant suffering the humiliation of occupation, and never living in a nation of their own. Moreover, this conflict has come with a larger cost the Middle East, as it impedes partnerships that could bring greater security, prosperity, and empowerment to ordinary people.

My Administration has worked with the parties and the international community for over two years to end this conflict, yet expectations have gone unmet.[63] Israeli settlement activity continues. Palestinians have walked away from talks. The world looks at a conflict that has grinded on for decades, and sees a stalemate. Indeed, there are those who argue that with all the change and uncertainty in the region, it is simply not possible to move forward.

I disagree. At a time when the people of the Middle East and North Africa are casting off the burdens of the past, the drive for a lasting peace that ends the conflict and resolves all claims is more urgent than ever.[64]

For the Palestinians, efforts to delegitimize Israel will end in failure. Symbolic actions to isolate Israel at the United Nations in September won't create an independent state. Palestinian leaders will not achieve peace or prosperity if Hamas insists on a path of terror and rejection. And Palestinians will never realize their independence by denying the right of Israel to exist.[65]

As for Israel, our friendship is rooted deeply in a shared history and shared values. Our commitment to Israel's security is unshakeable. And we will stand against attempts to single it out for criticism in international forums. But precisely because of our friendship, it is important that we tell the truth: the status quo is unsustainable, and Israel too must act boldly to advance a lasting peace.

The fact is, a growing number of Palestinians live west of the Jordan River. Technology will make it harder for Israel to defend itself.[66] A region undergoing profound change will lead to populism in which millions of people – not just a few leaders – must believe peace is possible.[67] The international community is tired of an endless process that never produces an outcome. The dream of a Jewish and democratic state cannot be fulfilled with permanent occupation.[68]

Ultimately, it is up to Israelis and Palestinians to take action. No peace can be imposed upon them, nor can endless delay make the problem go away.[69] But what America and the international community can do is state frankly what everyone knows: a lasting peace will involve two states for two peoples. Israel as a Jewish state and the homeland for the Jewish people, and the state of Palestine as the homeland for the Palestinian people; each state enjoying self-determination, mutual recognition, and peace.[70]

So while the core issues of the conflict must be negotiated, the basis of those negotiations is clear: a viable Palestine, and a secure Israel. The United States believes that negotiations should result in two states, with permanent Palestinian borders with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, and permanent Israeli borders with Palestine. The borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states.[71] The Palestinian people must have the right to govern themselves, and reach their potential, in a sovereign and contiguous state.

As for security, every state has the right to self-defense, and Israel must be able to defend itself – by itself[72] – against any threat. Provisions must also be robust enough to prevent a resurgence of terrorism; to stop the infiltration of weapons; and to provide effective border security. The full and phased withdrawal of Israeli military forces should be coordinated with the assumption of Palestinian security responsibility in a sovereign, non-militarized state.[73] The duration of this transition period must be agreed, and the effectiveness of security arrangements must be demonstrated.

These principles provide a foundation for negotiations. Palestinians should know the territorial outlines of their state; Israelis should know that their basic security concerns will be met. I know that these steps alone will not resolve this conflict. Two wrenching and emotional issues remain: the future of Jerusalem, and the fate of Palestinian refugees. But moving forward now on the basis of territory and security provides a foundation to resolve those two issues in a way that is just and fair, and that respects the rights and aspirations of Israelis and Palestinians.[74]

Recognizing that negotiations need to begin with the issues of territory and security does not mean that it will be easy to come back to the table. In particular, the recent announcement of an agreement between Fatah and Hamas raises profound and legitimate questions for Israel – how can one negotiate with a party that has shown itself unwilling to recognize your right to exist. In the weeks and months to come, Palestinian leaders will have to provide a credible answer to that question. Meanwhile, the United States, our Quartet partners, and the Arab states will need to continue every effort to get beyond the current impasse.

I recognize how hard this will be.[75] Suspicion and hostility has been passed on for generations, and at times it has hardened. But I'm convinced that the majority of Israelis and Palestinians would rather look to the future than be trapped in the past. We see that spirit in the Israeli father whose son was killed by Hamas, who helped start an organization that brought together Israelis and Palestinians who had lost loved ones. He said, "I gradually realized that the only hope for progress was to recognize the face of the conflict." And we see it in the actions of a Palestinian who lost three daughters to Israeli shells in Gaza. "I have the right to feel angry," he said. "So many people were expecting me to hate. My answer to them is I shall not hate…Let us hope," he said, "for tomorrow."[76]

That is the choice that must be made – not simply in this conflict, but across the entire region – a choice between hate and hope; between the shackles of the past, and the promise of the future. It's a choice that must be made by leaders and by people, and it's a choice that will define the future of a region that served as the cradle of civilization and a crucible of strife.

For all the challenges that lie ahead, we see many reasons to be hopeful. In Egypt, we see it in the efforts of young people who led protests. In Syria, we see it in the courage of those who brave bullets while chanting, 'peaceful,' 'peaceful.' In Benghazi, a city threatened with destruction, we see it in the courthouse square where people gather to celebrate the freedoms that they had never known. Across the region, those rights that we take for granted are being claimed with joy by those who are prying lose the grip of an iron fist.

For the American people, the scenes of upheaval in the region may be unsettling, but the forces driving it are not unfamiliar. Our own nation was founded through a rebellion against an empire. Our people fought a painful civil war that extended freedom and dignity to those who were enslaved. And I would not be standing here today unless past generations turned to the moral force of non-violence as a way to perfect our union – organizing, marching, and protesting peacefully together to make real those words that declared our nation: "We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal."[77]

Those words must guide our response to the change that is transforming the Middle East and North Africa – words which tell us that repression will fail, that tyrants will fall, and that every man and woman is endowed with certain inalienable rights. It will not be easy. There is no straight line to progress, and hardship always accompanies a season of hope.[78] But the United States of America was founded on the belief that people should govern themselves. Now, we cannot hesitate to stand squarely on the side of those who are reaching for their rights, knowing that their success will bring about a world that is more peaceful, more stable, and more just.[79]



[1] Every speech has what are called grace notes. They invariably thank the person who introduced the speaker, in this case Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and they generally say something about the venue or the tradition of the organization doing the hosting. This grace note is striking for its brevity and for its oddity. The President says he thinks that Hillary Clinton will go down as one of the greatest Secretaries of State in the nation's history, but from context what is the reason adduced for that? That she travels a lot. This is sort of insulting. The use of the phrase “she will go down” also struck me as either a Freudian slip or just an unfortunate turn of phrase. It may mean nothing and it may have been intended to mean nothing but, given the history between these two people, it stopped me short. Anything that stops a listener or a reader short, and thus detracts from the flow of what the speaker is saying, is not good.

[2] Well, duh. Could the speechwriter not have done better than this?

[3] There is a universe of comment inherent in this choice of words. In the first place, the President decided to use the word “people” very generically. This is very common in American political rhetoric but it is worth pointing out, I think, that the way this word translates into Arabic can be tricky. If indeed the Arabs are his main audience, then this should have mattered to the speechwriters and others who helped prepare the text. But in my experience there is very little attention paid to such matters at high levels of the U..S. government. There are a few words to choose from in Arabic to translate “ people”, and they do not mean the same thing by way of connotation to the listener. The translator might use a word that connotes membership in a tribal group (ahl), or he might use the word that connotes membership in a sectarian group. The way the President is using the word, namely as a synonym for citizens, barely exists at all in the Middle East.

The reference to human rights is also problematical. Westerners tend to think that there are such things as universal human rights. They think that because they are children of the Enlightenment, and because the Enlightenment ultimately takes as its source for such judgments the Judeo-Christian tradition. But the Western idea of universal rights, at least as encoded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1945, does not sit simply or easily on all cultures. A good example, which arises later in the speech, concerns gender equality. I think I can assure the President that at least some of the men out protesting in Syria against the Assad regime do not consider gender equality to be among their demands. So the statement actually hovers somewhere between misleading and untrue. None of this hurts the speech as it comes across to an American audience because most members of that audience have no idea about any of this.

[4] I would have cut this last sentence in this paragraph. I think the paragraph ends well enough without it, and I don't think the American people need reminding that we have interests of various sorts in the Middle East. I think the paragraph is weaker for that ending that it would have been without the sentence.

[5] The sentence would've sounded better if it had read “in ways that advance our values and strengthen our security.” If you pluralize “way” to allow you to remove the letter “s” from the end of advance and strengthen it makes the sentence more musical and also easier to read. It is also technically more accurate, because there isn't just one way to approach these challenges but several ways. Mistakes like this suggest to me, as I already have intimated above, that this speech was rushed and is not really finished.

[6] This is a fundamentally misleading and ungenerous remark. The Obama Administration has done nothing different in essence about the endgame in Iraq that its predecessor had not planned to do. The drawdown of combat troops was Bush Administration policy, too. The President is trying to take credit for something he did not initiate, for a policy he essentially inherited. Perhaps the President is trying to balance off against the impression that his policies in what used to be called the war on terror have been remarkably consistent with those of his predecessor, because those impressions are true – – and it is good that they are true. In policy area after policy area – – and I don't need to name them because they are well known – – this Administration came into office asserting that it would change this and that supposedly egregious policy and then learned that it either could not or should not do so. Nevertheless, anyone who was fooled by this statement about Iraq policy is either hopelessly partisan or simply has not been paying attention.

[7] This is a debatable statement, to say the least.

[8] The language here, “a transition to Afghan lead”, is very clumsy. It sounds like the sort of language military types would use in a memorandum. Again, to me it is evidence that this text is just a first or second draft and that it is not finished, not polished, not really of presidential quality.

[9] This is another debatable statement. On balance, I agree that killing bin Laden is important, but that interpretation is not self-evident and it is hotly debated in the expert community both here and abroad. I think that as a speechwriter I would have tried to express this in a way that did not lay open a disagreement that I was not prepared to spend time closing.

[10] A remarkably strange statement. One does not say that someone “was” a martyr. A martyr is by definition someone who is dead, so the only way to be a martyr is in the present tense in the eyes of living others. I suppose one could say that someone who was killed a long time ago, and who used to be venerated as a martyr, “was” a martyr, but it makes no sense to say this about bin Laden. It could have been, I thought maybe, that the President misread his text, so I checked against the official version, and no, he did not misread it. He read it as it was written. How weird.

[11] Let me preface my remark here by simply noting that I am not and never have been a fan of Osama bin Laden. But the statement is condescending to the point of offense. In the first place, of course Osama bin Laden rejected what the President calls individual rights for Muslims. No Muslim cleric (which bin Laden was not) places the Western concept of individual rights above the welfare of the community (maslaha al-umma). This is a category error which has as its source a deep ignorance of the cultural differences between the West and the Islamic world. This sort of thing happens all the time. It happened repeatedly during the Bush Administration and it is happening all over again now. I have come to believe that bridging this gap is hopeless. But more important for now, the President insinuates that Osama bin Laden's goal, juxtaposed against democracy, was violent extremism. That is a nonsensical statement. Violent extremism was his means, not his goal. As everyone knows, his goal was to create a unified caliphate that Muslims would then employ to spread their presumably true religion across the globe. Islam is a universalist religion, like Christianity, and like Christianity it is an evangelical religion. Bin Laden was not in fact a nihilist, employing violence for the sake of violence. He did have a purpose, warped and fancifully romantic as it was. To misunderstand or misrepresent this is really to belittle ourselves, not bin Laden.

[12] This of course is true, and it is one reason why there have been so many defectors from al-Qaeda over the years. At least some of its sympathizers came to realize that bin Laden had no plan that could be remotely described as a social or economic program for his brand of Islamic politics. This is one of the reasons that he had already become almost obsolete as the symbol of a cause by the time of his death. That doesn't mean it was pointless to kill him., however. Indeed, we should have done it a long time ago.

[13] Yes, as I just said. But here in the speech is where the President, if he or his advisers had had any conceptual innovation to put forth, is where that idea belongs. Simply to say that the people of the Middle East and North Africa have taken the future into their own hands is, frankly, pretty lame. First of all, it is not true. Not all the people of this region have risen up. Nothing much is happening Algeria, for example, and nothing at all is happening in Sudan – – a country which has plenty of local problems of its own. But second, this was the place to actually lay down some thinking, and there is none.

Just to give one example of how this might have been done, as a result of what has been happening over the past several months, divisions among groups of countries in the region are now far more clear than they were in the past. In the past, the region could be said to have been divided between traditional monarchies of one stripe or another and republican governments that in almost every case had devolved to military or police states, again of one stripe or another. This is the simple typology, for example, that informed Malcolm Kerr’s classic book on the Arab Cold War. Now things really have changed. We have a group of conservative monarchies, some of which are farther along on the road to political pluralism than others. But these define a coherent group and within that group, with the exception of Bahrain because of its peculiar sectarian balance, there have not been serious uprisings. Second, we have a small group of non-monarchical authoritarian regimes that have not yet been challenged by their peoples, and that includes Sudan, Algeria for all practical purposes, and Mauritania as an outlier (in more ways than one). Third, we have a group of countries now actively assaulting their own people: Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Two of these countries have not been American friends or associates for a very long time, and the third of these, like Pakistan, has been playing a necessary double game – – but we have been playing, too, for lack of any better available alternative. And then last, fourth, we have at least three countries that have made it to the other side or at least have a good chance of doing so. That group includes, first and foremost, Tunisia, which has the best chance of ending up some kind of recognizable democracy. It also includes Egypt, and of course it includes Iraq. Between these three countries live more than half of all Arabs, so this is hardly an insignificant group. (As usual, no one knows where to put Lebanon because it is sui generis.) Now this is hardly the only way to think about the region these days, a typology that Amir Taheri referred to rather creatively as the Broken Crescent, or something very similar. That is the kind of concept, that is the kind of language nugget that one of the President's speechwriters should have been able to come up with. And didn't. So we're left with this hopelessly vague statement about the region as a whole that adds absolutely nothing to our stock of knowledge or our way of understanding what is happening.

[14] Two remarks on the sentence. First, there is a difference between a government that is authoritarian, that is despotic and that is tyrannous. But American politicians, whether they be Presidents or Congressman or what-have-you, seem never to make any distinctions among the nondemocratic regimes in the region or, for that matter, in the world. They lump them all together as though they were the same – – as though very nasty police states like the old regime in Iraq and the one today and Syria are essentially the same as the soft authoritarianism of Jordan or of Oman. No one should be surprised that this, because there is a similar tendency to think that all democracies are the same, whether they are parliamentary or presidential or partial or firmly institutionalized or again what-have-you. Americans are Manichaean at heart, incapable of recognizing more than two sides of anything, so there is nothing the least bit surprising in this. Of course, I do not expect a political speech to be didactic. That would be asking too much, and it would be ineffective as a political speech in any event. But I do still hope, sometimes, for little more subtlety and a little less mindlessness when other parts of the world are described for American audiences. I probably hope in vain. Second, it was a good idea to use the word dignity here. That word resonates loudly and well in translation. It is a concept, like justice, that makes deep sense to Arabs.

[15] This is an amazing remark for any educated Americans to make. The people who protested in Boston back in 1773 were not protesting the fact that they were asked to pay taxes to a king. They had been paying taxes to a king for a long time, and never thought anything of it. The problem here was that the taxes that were being assessed were being assessed without reference to local authority. Not that Britain back then was a democracy, but it did have both the rule of law and means of political accountability. The colonists were sensitive to the fact that they were involved in a social contract and that they had rights as Englishmen. Now, just incidentally, the President's use of the word king here probably was not intended as a direct insult or affront to the Saudi monarchy, but that is almost certainly how it will be read. So I don't know if this sentence was written simply out of ignorance or if it was meant to be a poke in the chest in Riyadh. It is, either way, a real corker.

[16] The use of the word “won” is interesting here. I am sure that the speechwriter never gave it a second thought, but it is not actually an accurate word to describe what happened. Some countries won their independence, like Algeria against France. Some countries, like Saudi Arabia, were never colonized in the first place. Saudi Arabia in its current territorial configuration is the result of an aggression against the Hejaz in 1924 and, in a minor key, another aggression against Yemen for the province of Asir a few years later. As for most of the Gulf sheikdoms, they were given independence by Britain when it decided to withdraw East of Suez in the early 1970s. The United Arab Emirates, and there are seven of them, were cobbled together by the British and called the Trucial States. They did not want the British to leave; they did not want to become an independent country. They liked things the way they were. But the British left anyway. So what exactly did they win? To say that Egypt or Iraq or Syria won independence is also rather excessively simplified. As those who know their history understand, these political entities became more or less sovereign in a process that had to do with the devolution of the British and French empires and the advent of the Second World War. Again, one does not expect a political speech to be didactic. A little more care with vocabulary would be nice once in a while, however, because it would prevent those who do know the history of the area, and that includes a great number of those who live in the area, from wondering whether American political leaders are really as ignorant as they sound.

[17] Again, an unfortunate remark. Of course we know what the President means, and we know what the speechwriter tried to do, but the fact of the matter is that political power always rests in the hands of a few. Democracy is not synonymous with plebiscite. The difference between a democracy and political systems that are not democratic is not that power itself rests in the hands of a few people, it is how those few people come to acquire and how they exert power. It is about legitimacy and authority and accountability, not about numbers.

[18] As I mentioned above, I find the use of this term self-determination very odd in this context. That term is most commonly associated with group phenomena. It is a Wilsonian piece of vocabulary in its most common uses. I do not recall ever having heard it used before as a synonym for two terms very common in the history of American political speech, namely liberty and freedom. Why a speechwriter or a President would conclude that there is something wrong with the word liberty or the word freedom I simply do not know. Maybe the word freedom was avoided so that Obama would not be accused of parroting Bush. But why not use the word liberty, which is actually what the sentence is talking about?

[19] I apologize for being so pedantic, but again this is just not a very good sentence. In the first place, only parts of the global economy are knowledge-based economies so it would have been better to have said, “As the global economy becomes increasingly based on knowledge and innovation…” And then it makes no sense to use as the noun “development strategy.” It is not a development strategy we’re talking about here, but an actual economy. This is just sloppy expression, again, typical of an early draft.

[20] This is the first paragraph in the speech with which I have absolutely no quarrel.

[21] I find it interesting that the President seems to be endowing technology with causal power. This may prove to be correct, at least in part. But it seems to me a very desiccated theory of political change. Is the President saying that had it not been for this technology no level of repression, no level of heroism, no other way for young people to develop political ideas would've been enough to stimulate protest? This is the logical extension of the remark, and I find it improbable.

[22] We speechwriters, or recovering speechwriters in my case, call these last four remarks concretizing. This has become a very popular trope in American speechmaking in recent decades. I think it got its greatest boost during the Reagan Administration, and because President Reagan was so good at this sort of thing subsequent speechwriting teams figured it would work for their principals too. I am not particularly fond of the technique; if you're not really careful it comes out just sounding cheesy. In this case I don't mind it so much, but later on in the speech the President does it again in the context of Israelis and Palestinians. And there it does come off cheesy to me. I guess the rule is, you can do this once in a speech and get away with it, but more than once is probably not a good idea.

[23] I would not have said this in this fashion, because it implies that although terrorists accomplished less than nonviolent protesters, they nevertheless did accomplish something. I don't think the President meant to say that, but that's what he said. He should not have.

[24] I'm glad the President said this, obvious as it is. This remark also helps him set up his later remark that long-term and short-term aims do not always match. This is one reason why I said above that President Obama is neither completely a sudden idealist now anymore that he was ever completely a realist before.

[25] This paragraph marks a transition into the next section of the speech. So far the President has described what has been going on in the region although, in my opinion, not particularly successfully. Now comes what this has to do with United States. There's nothing the matter with this transition. It might have been done a bit more elegantly, but it works.

I do think, however, that the order in which American goals are stated leaves something to be desired. I would've started with the free flow of commerce and safeguarding the security of the region, then moved to talking about not just Israeli security but the security of all American allies – – we did after all go to war to liberate Iraq. And I would've mentioned the terrorism and counter proliferation set third not only because it is the newest in terms of chronology but also because it would've been helpful as a segue had the President decided to discuss the implications of Middle Eastern democracy for regional and international security. That would've been an obvious thing to do and I am somewhat puzzled that no attempt whatsoever was made here to connect the potential future of a democratic Arab world with the security implications for the region and beyond. When the President was said in advance of the speech to be in search of a new concept, a new way to conceive what has been going on as whole, this is what I thought he meant to discuss at the least. He does suggest below that there is a connection between repression in the region and threats to the United States. This is very Bush Administration-like. But there is nothing about the implications of political pluralism within the region for relations among the states of the region. I find this omission very curious.

[26] This would've been a good opportunity to make the point that when energy prices go up it actually hurts poor people more than it hurts the world’s affluent people. It might've been an opportunity too to make just a passing comment indicating an understanding that changes in American energy policy are relevant here, but I can see why a speechwriter would not have wanted to broaden the subject matter, fearing too much diffusion.

[27] I do not think that these three interests are reasonably defined as narrow. The President just said that American interests fulfilled are good for everybody, or nearly everybody, and he was right. A well governed whole, and a peaceful and prosperous international order, are not narrow goals and they do not lack a very significant moral component. The fact of the matter is that a well ordered international economic system based on open trade does too fill stomachs. Let me say also in passing that the word “speak” is used twice out of seven words spanning two sentences, and it is used in different contexts – – that is awkward and is further sign of a speech draft not yet polished.

[28] This reference to speaking to the aspirations of ordinary people is the best evidence I have of the purpose of the speech, that he wishes to go over the heads of the region's rulers and talk to the people, as he very generically understands the use of the word people. There is a case to be made for this. This is what many observers have been meaning for a while now by the phrase transformational diplomacy, the idea that just engaging with other countries through the diplomatic process as traditionally conceived, and through civil society and other nongovernmental contacts on the other end, with nothing in between, no longer suffices as a way of operating in a far more complex and integrated world. I agree with that. But as I suggested earlier, we have to ask the question: What does getting the street in the Middle East on your side actually accomplish in terms of policy? It is not as though any country in the region is going to turn out to be a plebicitory democracy. There will always be elites to deal with, and we will never be better at manipulating popular opinion in other countries than the leaders of those countries are likely to be most of the time. So it sounds very noble to talk directly to the people of other countries, and as I say there is a place for it. But I don't think it's obvious how we connect the dots to achieve discrete policy outcomes that we wish to achieve.

[29] Of all of the unfortunate locutions in this speech, this sentence contains the worst one of all. This reference to Islam, to “Muslim communities”, is just flat a bad idea. The President’s Cairo speech of 2009, which he mentions just below, was suffused with pan-Islamic assumptions. I did not particularly like it then, but it makes no sense at all now to conflate what has been going on in individual countries of the region into something that has to do with Islam or with Muslims. In Egypt it is about Egyptians, and that includes Christians as well as Muslims in Egypt. In Tunisia it is about Tunisians, and in Yemen it is about Yemenis and so on. Of course, religion in the form of political theology plays a major role in all these countries, as it also does in ours, however dimly aware of that fact we may be. But it is not the job of the President of the United States to encourage that. The less we try to turn our engagement with the Middle East into being about religion the better. A most unfortunate choice of words.

[30] Yet again this weird phrase. Why could the President not have said that we care about the freedom or the liberty of individuals?

[31] Here there is an unwarranted assumption about the nature of political economy in the Arab world. I do not want to spend a lot of time talking about this, or we could be here for days. But I want just to point out that the formula for legitimacy of government is not the same from culture to culture. In some Arab countries fear and repression are manifest, no doubt about it. But it is a leap from that fact to assume that because large numbers of Arabs do not like their governments it means ipso facto that they are illegitimate in their eyes. That makes sense to Americans, but it doesn't necessarily make sense to Arabs. The way one becomes a leader in that culture is to assemble and master a network of personal relationships, the character of which is best described as an interlocking web of ongoing unbalanced indebtedness. Anyone who will climb to the pinnacle of power must get there this way. Even when there are elections in Arab countries they are not actual decision points as they are in Western democracy; they are acclamations of facts already in being. So the idea the President is asserting here, that fear and repression are the only reasons why Arabs do not revolt, or have not revolted in the past, is simply not true. For good historical reasons, Arabs fear social chaos. They are prepared to put up with even a very unpleasant order for a long time rather than risk anarchy. As I say, much more could be discussed on this point, but I think it's enough for the purpose at hand.

[32] An absolutely breathtaking remark. Those decades during which we “accepted the world as it is” obviously don't include the period from October 2001 to January 2009 – – nearly a decade. Interesting that the President does not see fit to even mention any of that.

[33] Here is where the President leaves himself an out to act like a realist when he needs to. I'm glad he said this.

[34] A very broad and general statement. One supposes that the President means to refer to domestic political affairs, but the sentence could be interpreted more broadly than that. It could be used by some to refer to Israeli occupation of the West Bank or military action against terrorists in Gaza. Maybe there is a reason the statement is so broad but I don't know what it is. There is also a possibility that the rebels in Libya might feel they need some point to use violence against tribal elements in the west of the country that do not support them. In the context of a civil war will the United States also oppose all use of violence against people? That sounds rather quixotic.

[35] This comes up again later, but I would've left out this business about gender equality. And of course the President means rights which we think are universal, but which as a matter of social science we ought to know are not, or at least not yet. I will explain in a bit more detail below why I would've left out the gender equality remark.

[36] Okay, the President is trying to stress something here. He's trying to say that political reform is now a top priority matter. But he says it as though it is something new, when it is clearly what the Bush Administration tried also to make a high priority. The President doesn't even mention the forward strategy for freedom, or the Middle East Partnership Initiative, or any of the programs – – and there were dozens of them and many are ongoing even his Administration – – that were put together for precisely this purpose. This is what led some early commentators to claim that Obama is really a neoconservative. As I have already suggested, this does not start in the Bush Administration either. It goes back a very long way in American history, certainly at least to the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Administrations, which determined that democratic outcomes in Germany, Japan, and Italy had to be primary war aims and that the dissolution of the colonial empires of our allies were also firm American policy. All that said, it does indeed ring strange to hear President Obama say these things as though they have never before been said, as though somehow only in the past few months his Administration thought of this. It is actually sort of embarrassing to listen to because it can easily be seen or interpreted as an admission that the Administration had it all wrong until Thursday. Why do this, especially when it is at best a partial truth?

[37] It is not obvious, at least not to me, that thousands would've been killed, and is not obvious that the path the United States chose will eventually produce an outcome with fewer civilian deaths in Libya then would've been the case had we properly minded our own damned business. We have abetted a civil war that is likely to remain stalemated in violence for a long time.

[38] If the President thinks that the intervention in Libya has warned Arab rulers in other authoritarian states away from using violence against their own people, then how does he explain what is going on in Syria? Does he think that if violence breaks out in Sudan between North and South that the example of Libya is going to make any difference to how Omar al-Bashir conducts himself? The fact of the matter is that when authoritarian rulers think that their backs are against the wall, examples from other countries are not going to make one damned bit of difference to how they respond. There is a limit to the demonstration effect in cases like this.

[39] An arguable assertion. Will the President still say that time is working against Gadhafi if he manages to pull off a major deadly terrorist attack via proxies against American interests?

[40] These sanctions are risible. They will have no effect on Syrian policy. The President is suggesting here that the humanitarian situation was much worse in Libya then it is in Syria. I don't think that is at all obvious. And so far there is no indication of possible use of American force or even any other sort of policy exertion below the line of sight against Syria. Maybe those exertions below the line of sight are going on and by their very nature we are not supposed to know about them. I hope that is true, but I have no evidence that it is.

[41] Some Syrian protesters have demanded democracy, true. But most are simply demanding that the regime cease. They are united on that point, but they are not likely to be united, assuming they get their way, on what should follow. We already see a similar dynamic in Egypt. It is characteristic of Americans to think that all protests must have as one of their main elements a demand for democracy. This is simply a case of Americans thoughtlessly projecting their own frame of reference onto other people. As I have said before, there are lots of reasons, good reasons, why Syrians and other long-abused citizens of Arab countries are now prepared to take to the streets on behalf of their rights, but it does not follow that they in their majority either understand or want the kind of procedural democracy that we take as second nature when we use the word. Do I think that the President and his speechwriters actually know this quite well indeed but have simply decided for the sake of parsimony not to complicate an otherwise useful point in a speech? Actually, no; I don't think they understand this. I see no evidence that they do.

[42] The President says nothing here about the American role in this pressure on Syria from without. What are the Syrian supposed to think when they read this sentence? Do the protesters understand it to mean that we will help them in some way? On what basis could they reach such a conclusion? Will the Assad regime now fear us more and change its ways? To ask the question is to know the answer. So we start a war against Libya, for humanitarian reasons supposedly, in a situation where no vital national security interests or foreign policy goals are really at issue, yet in Syria, which is allied with Iran, which continuously befouls the politics of Lebanon, which has been complicit in killing American soldiers in Iraq over the years, which is a supporter of terrorism, and which exerts itself in every way possible to foil progress in the peace process, we do what? We offer words entirely bereft of specific promises or threats.

[43] This is an oddly muddled sentence. The point here is supposed to be that the Iranians are helping the Syrians suppress the Syrian people. The reference to suppressing its own people inside Iran obscures the point. The way to have said this, then, is “this speaks to the hypocrisy of the Iranian regime which says it stands for the right of protesters abroad even as it suppresses its own people at home”, or something like that.

[44] A missed opportunity here to mention her name. Neda Agha-Soltan has justifiably become iconic in Iran and in the region. Here was an opportunity to concretize a point without all the cheesy accoutrement. Of course the President doesn't mention that when all this happened in the streets of Tehran, he did his best to ignore it while still futilely trying to “engage” the Iranian regime. Maybe this statement suggests that the President at least has some kind of learning curve when it comes to this part of the world. One can hope so.

[45] This sentence would've been more accurate and just as powerful had the word universal been left out. Why raise a distracting dispute when there is no reason to?

[46] Ditto. The constitution and legal code of Bahrain is what establishes the rights of all citizens in that country. There is no need to invoke any other authority. And it is actually much more effective in a case like this to tell a leader you don't like that we’re not asking you to behave like us, but only asking to enforce your own laws and principles.

[47] It will be noted here that there is not a single word in the speech about Saudi Arabia, as if it is not really a very important country. The country's name is never mentioned. If the President had really been brave, or foolhardy, depending on one's point of view, this is the place to have mentioned it. I'm glad he did not. The Saudis are deeply irritated with us, largely over Bahrain, and they are very afraid of what is going on, or else they would not be prepared to tilt now toward favoring the survival of the Syrian regime that for all sorts of excellent reasons they despise. I am no friend of the Saudi regime; I think we have coddled them beyond need for much too long. They are part of our 911 problem far more than they have been part of the solution to it. Still, I am not eager to push them over the edge until I am confident that what would follow would represent an improvement, if not for the Saudi population, then for U.S. interests. I am not there yet.

[48] Here we have a bald grammatical mistake. In the previous sentence the noun is Iraqi, singular. Suddenly the pronoun now is “they”. Did anyone even proofread this thing?

[49] Of course everybody knows, if they think about it, that whatever potential Iraq has to be a leader in the region as a democratic country is a function of the fact that the United States led a war to get rid of the Baathist regime before it. Barack Obama opposed that war. Now, this does not mean that going to war when and how we did was on balance a wise decision. But for an American President to get up on a podium and praise the situation in Iraq while ignoring completely how that situation came about is passing strange. Only in the world of American partisan politics is such a thing not only possible, but likely to barely cause an eyelash to bat when it happens.

[50] As I have said before using this method of annotating speeches, I really dislike this grammatical liberty. America should use all of “its” assets.

[51] I have thought about this remark a lot, trying to understand what it means to say that the legitimacy of the government depends on active and informed citizens. The legitimacy of government depends on different things in different cultures, as we have already said. In a democracy, the legitimacy of government depends upon whether the procedures of its coming into being aligned with constitutional law. Strictly speaking, an active and informed citizenry has nothing to do with it. In a young democracy, should one begin to put down roots in Tunisia or Egypt or Libya or other countries in the region, I suppose public pressure for staying on the straight and narrow is a good thing, because there will be old regime elements opposed and trying to subvert the processes of reform. But the fact of the matter is that information technology can be used by the bad guys as well as good guys. It can be used by religious fanatics as well as by democratic reformers. One only has to remember at an earlier time that the technology of the cassette played an enormous role in helping the mullahs in Iran come to power. So while this sentence sounds good, like many other remarks in the speech, it actually doesn't make much sense.

[52] Another example of the use of language indicating an early and unpolished draft: the region “is” the birthplace of three world religions, not “was” the birthplace. The religions still exist, after all, and so does the place.

[53] As I promised, I will now explain why this insistence on gender equality is not a good idea on balance. Of course we want gender equality and of course we should fund programs that support it. But in this part of the world, where a civilizational dispute about religion and politics is ongoing, for a country outside the region that is identified as a Christian country and with Western secularism at the same time to try to lecture Islamic societies about how to treat women has the general effect of empowering those who use religion for political purposes. This is a complicated subject about which many pages have been written, and I do not intend to repeat them all here, but, in short, religious radicals in the region seek to use religion and religious symbols in their battles against those with whom they disagree. For a country like the United States, which for a variety of reasons is not wildly popular on the street in most countries of the Arab world, this kind of lecturing just helps the bad guys.

There is a deeper point to be made here. These upheavals in the Arab world probably do hurt al- Qaeda and related groups, as has been widely asserted, because what has happened in Egypt and Tunisia shows that there are other and better ways to bring about change than to use of terrorism. But what has happened is likely also to open up space for a more explicit religious politics in most countries, and to help organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood in the fullness of time. This does not mean that the Muslim Brotherhood or similar organizations will resort to violence either within their countries or projected from them in the form of terrorism. But it does mean, to the extent that these kinds of groups gain political power, that these societies will look increasingly unpleasant to Westerners, and especially to Western liberals, and gender discrimination is likely to be prominent in that unpleasantness. There is simply no basis within Islamic thinking or experience for gender equality. But the choice in these societies is not between secular humanism and wild-eyed Islamic fanaticism. The former is pretty much out of the question and the latter is not very likely. I, for one, am content with the idea that these societies will for a long time be very different from Western ones, so long as they do not constitute a national security threat to the United States or its allies. That is a situation I can live with; it is preferable, I think, to trying to force them to be like us only to end up helping our worst enemies in these countries.

Besides, in order for these countries to move toward more plural political orders they will have to reconstitute the rule of law in their societies, and perhaps the only way they can do this is by adopting a rule of law much closer to religious tradition then we might like. Our kind of rule of law is not the only kind. The danger here is that out a generation or two, based on a more explicitly religious politics than has been the case in most of these countries since their gaining independence, a new wave of Salafi fanaticism and terrorism might be born. But that depends on whether the societies manage to face up to and conquer the challenges before them. If they do, there is no reason in particular to fear such a second wave. If they don't, there is.

[54] No quarrels with this paragraph. You see, it does happen.

[55] More odd language. What does an expansion of growth mean? It sounds almost definitionally redundant. What would've been wrong with saying that successful democratic transitions depend on economic growth and broad-based prosperity?

[56] The President makes the statement as though it is obvious. It is not. A great deal of social science research has been done on the connection between political pluralism and levels of economic growth and distribution. On balance, I would say the President is probably right, if he means not that democratic transitions themselves depend on economic growth, but that their capacity to endure depends on economic growth. The exception, however, is when growth is so rapid and so mal-distributed – – as is often the case in periods of rapid growth – – that it becomes politically destabilizing. The idea that rapid economic growth is socially and politically stabilizing is an old American assumption, and it is completely wrong. People throw around the term “creative destruction” all the time, but few ever think about why Joseph Schumpeter came up with it in the first place.

[57] These are words that could come from any Republican. It is good to hear them now coming quite often also from Democrats.

[58] Yet another example of just strange language, not thought through. How can the goal of anything be a model? A model is a means, not an end. The goal has to be an economy, a real situation, in which good things are true.

[59] This statement and others to follow should have been more carefully conditionalized. As I explained in my preamble, Egypt is not yet a democracy. The old regime, the military/bureaucratic regime, is still in place and it still has life and the capacity to defend itself against genuine reform. As I've already said, it sends a bad signal to the present transitional military junta in Egypt to simply assume that Egypt is a democracy. It might tempt them to do things with regard to the September election that they might not otherwise have been tempted to do. We have leverage over Egypt and particularly over the Army. We now suggest that we will not use this leverage. Possibly a serious tactical misjudgment; time will tell.

[60] I hope the President and his associates do not repeat the mistake of their predecessors by imagining that Arabs will use investment funds the same way that East and Central Europeans did after the end of the Cold War. There is such a thing called political economy. It is a concept that expresses the relationship between power and money in a society. There are several models of political economy; they tend to be shaped by experience – – which is to say by a combination of culture and history. What went on in Central and Eastern Europe after 1991 will not be the same thing that goes on now in the Middle East and North Africa. I'm almost embarrassed to have to point this out, but it appears that someone has to point it out.

[61] Two comments on this paragraph, if I may. First, the idea of a Middle East free trade area is not new. This idea may have even preceded the Bush Administration – – I frankly don't know – – but it was part of the Bush Administration. That I do know, because I had to draft speeches over at the State Department in which that idea was fairly prominent. Again, the President trots out this idea as though he or his Administration thought it up. Second, the reference to the European Union here is really very weird. It is true of course that the strictures that the European Union laid down for the expansion of its membership did a world of good in encouraging recently freed Soviet satellite countries to reform their institutions in all the right ways. But the European Union was created by Europeans, not by outsiders. The way this paragraph reads, it is the United States, together with the European Union, that is going to be the leading edge for forming someone else's regional trade arrangement. To those in the region who are suspicious of Western economic exploitation, this might come across as something quite sinister. I have to give this more thought. But what I do know is that the invocation of the EU example here just doesn't fit.

[62] As I have already said, this is where the speech should have ended. This last tacked-on section about Israel/Palestine detracts from the focus on what is really going on in the Arab world today. As I have also said, I'm grateful at least that the President did not excessively link Israel/Palestine to these other dynamics, as seemed to be his wont when the Administration began. But it seems that in no longer making that claim he seems to be at a loss for making any claim at all about the relationship of domestic politics in the region broadly construed to the Israel/Palestine dilemma. The only rationale for talking about Israel/Palestine, then, it seems, is his acknowledgment that a lot of people care about it. For speech that was supposed to create a new overarching concept of the region, this is pretty weak brew.

[63] In the past the President has been more candid about the Administration’s responsibility for the current situation. I wish he had been as candid this time. Obviously, there is plenty of blame to go around for why things are the way they are, but the mistakes the Administration made its first year are clearly responsible for the situation to some degree.

[64] The President makes a fairly bold statement here, namely that because the region is changing a solution to the Israel/Palestine conflict is more urgent than ever. Notice, however, that he never says why. He makes no attempt whatsoever to link the two causally, except to say that the conflict prevents many potentially beneficial relationships coming into being, which is true but which is also just pablum. There is no analytic element here, none whatsoever. I think the reason why there is no analytical element is obvious: these guys simply don't know what the connections are.

[65] These are bold, clear, powerful formulations. Why couldn't the rest of the speech been as skillfully drawn?

[66] Probably true, but not self-evident. Defensive and offensive military technology rock back and forth, or at least they have historically. But in a speech, the statement is defensible.

[67] This is garbled. I'm not sure the speechwriter knows what populism is. I'm not exactly sure what this sentence is supposed to mean, but I think it means that with the region changing and popular opinion becoming more directly relevant to state policies throughout the region, that it is important for people to believe in the possibility of a negotiated peace that is just and stable. I think that is right. Unfortunately, that is not what the sentence says. Far more likely, actually, more democratic polities in the Arab world become less likely peacemaking with Israel will thrive, not more. The governments in this part of the world have been in the main far more pragmatic and moderate than popular opinion. Popular opinion in many, if not most, countries of the Arab world is not just anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli but also anti-Semitic. And many of them are anti-Semitic in truly classical, clinical, highly irrational ways. We have already seen this phenomenon at work in Egypt, where the government, in order to ingratiate itself to a newly mobilized mass, has tilted sharply against Israel and toward Hamas. That is part of the explanation for the unity agreement between Hamas and Fatah. Again, I don't expect the President in a speech of this kind to tell the truth about the volatile potential of democratic public opinion in the Arab world just because it's true. But I have to wonder whether he knows it’s true.

[68] This is a strange and actually quite offensive remark, although I'm sure it is not deliberately offensive. The dream of a Jewish state that is also a democratic state has already been fulfilled. It is no longer a dream; it is a reality. What the President is saying, or trying to say, is that that achievement is vulnerable. And in this he is correct. I suppose the question here is just how many garbled sentences one speech can carry without falling flat on its face. This one is getting very close.

[69] This is a nice sentence but I would've broken it into two. For the sake of emphasis I would've let the assertion that no peace can be imposed stand by itself. Then I would've said, after a brief pause, “On the other hand”, or something like that, infinite delay will not make the problem disappear. I think it just would've been a better presentation done that way.

[70] Here the speech uses the term self-determination properly, which only makes those earlier uses in which the term is used improperly all the more glaring. I am also glad that the Administration reasserted the inevitability of a two state solution, because not only is it the only possible solution of any practical kind, but also because it is important for others to see that the United States government has not lost its mind on this subject as have so many so-called Western intellectuals.

[71] A very hot argument has arisen just in the past 24 hours over this sentence. Some people are claiming that the explicit mention of the 1967 lines is a change in American policy, and that it raises the prospect that when the Palestinians do reengage negotiations they will start from the 1967 borders and try to pinch Israel inward so that land exchanges will involve territory that was Israeli also before 1967. This is possible. This is why, evidently, Prime Minister Netanyahu has already reportedly written to the President objecting to this formulation. I don't see that it is necessarily so, however. The Clinton parameters spoke of the West Bank being returned, or rather turned over to a Palestinian state, in the mid-90%s – – 94% to 96%. Those were the numbers that President Clinton used. Since land swaps were also contemplated here, it means that if Israel annexes 4-6% of the West Bank then the area that has to be swapped over to the Palestinians logically cannot come from anywhere except from land that was Israel before 1967. So there is really no difference here. The President merely stated a point that the last half-dozen U.S. administrations have taken for granted. There are only two possible reasons why some people got so upset about this, and claimed that Obama was throwing Israel under the axle and other such grossly exaggerated phrases. Either they are ignorant or they are spinning for political purposes, trying to prey upon those who are ignorant.

[72] This little phrase, made up of just two words, is good to see. It is code for opposition to elaborate schemes of NATO or international forces inserted into the area that would be purportedly able to defend Israel in what would otherwise be indefensible borders.

[73] Now here there is a difference between this statement and the Clinton parameters. In the latter Israel retains three facilities inside the West Bank, with Palestinian liaison, to monitor security situations. This implies that Israel is to have no such stations inside West Bank. That is a clear tilt toward the Palestinians. As others have pointed out, to make a speech that tilts at least in this way if not also in others toward the Palestinians right after Fatah has made a unity agreement with an organization that does not recognize Israel's right to exist amounts to a rewarding bad behavior. I agree with that assessment. On the other hand, perhaps the President is trying to get the Palestinians to back away from UN unilateralism this coming September, and wants to create a more appealing track for them. If that is the intent, then it makes some sense. We will have to wait to see if this is so.

[74] It is also something of a novelty to separate borders and security from Jerusalem and refugees. I can understand why the President wants to do this. He wants to break down the problems into more manageable chunks. Maybe if a trade can be agreed on the first two issues, then it makes tea latter two easier to handle. There is, however, another way to look at this. From the Israeli point of view, the refugee issue is all bound up in security. They are not separate issues. What the Israelis want and have always wanted from the negotiations is an end of conflict conclusion. Israel wants an agreement that prevents the Palestinians from raising new demands after the ink has dried. No Israeli government will sign an agreement just on borders and security when the Palestinians are able to negate the practical implications of the agreement by raising the refugee issue after the fact. So in practice all four of these issues must be done together, or none of them will be done at all. I therefore do not like this innovation as stated.

[75] If the President really recognizes how hard this will be then he wouldn't disagree so readily with people who say this is not a propitious time to try to move forward. He still seems to have not learned one thing: that if you force a negotiation against the grain of any possibility that it might succeed, you actually do harm. You raise expectations only to dash them, and that tends to drive political power into the arms of those least amenable to compromise.

[76] As I have already said, I would've left this stuff out. There are plenty of other ways to have knitted up the text in order to get off the stage.

[77] I was waiting for this. I'm glad I found it. Every presidential speech of significance must be enmeshed in a sacred narrative of one kind or another. It sure did take long enough for the speech to get around to it, but better late than never.

[78] This could've been done better. It sort of sounds like a mixed metaphor; “hardship” and “season” just don't seem really go together. I would've said it this way: “Hardship always accompanies hope and there is always disappointment even in a new season of growth.” I think that sounds a lot better, more musical and I think it achieves the elevation you want toward the end of the speech like this. I suppose it's a matter of taste.

[79] Well here, finally at the very end of the speech, we have at least some attempt to connect what is happening in the region to their broader consequences for security, prosperity, and regional if not global peace. I suppose better late than never, again, but I wish more thought had been put into this critical subject. What we have here is a restatement of democratic peace theory in a nutshell – – that democracy is good for peace, stability and justice. I believe that, too, at least in the long run. The problem is getting to the long run. The social science and historical data do not support the contention that young democracies are peaceful, stable or capable of dispensing justice. Young, under-institutionalized democracies are in fact rather bellicose, prone to political temper tantrums and very uneven on the question of justice. Mature democracies, however, are very good for peace and for stability and for justice, and also for prosperity in case anyone is interested in that. At least he tried. Besides, he had to end the speech some way. But as with most of the speech, the speechwriter could've done better.