Thursday, March 26, 2009

Just a short note for today, again on Afghanistan.

Since I wrote last on U.S. policy in Afghanistan, I have read at least half a dozen pieces arguing against the minimalist approach--the idea that the Administration is doing more and promising less in order to bring capabilities into lines with a pessimistic assessment of achievable outcomes. The arguments insist that a real counterinsurgeny strategy can win the war. We are warned, at the same time, that victory will cost plenty and take many years, but indeed we can win. They plead for money, time and patience from the American people. I'm an American people, and here's how that sounds to me.

Well OK, Senators Lieberman and McCain, Max Boot, and the other nine people I've heard this from lately, let me ask you this.  Suppose I grant the thesis that we can in fact win: But what are the opportunity costs of spending resources, lives and time in Afghanistan against wherever else they may be needed?  Tilt as you will against real decreases in defense spending, they are here and they will stay for a while whether we like it or not. Are you sure Afghanistan is where we should be spending so much?  

Another question: Suppose we win -- how secure will victory be?  It's a nasty neighborhood, and Afghanistan has never been a normal conventional state. Another question: What will winning in Afghanistan mean for Pakistan, arguably a more important stake -- a much more populous country, with nuclear weapons. How do you win in Afghanistan without doing things that risk destabilizing Pakistan further?  If you don't have an answer to this one, you need to go back to start, do not pass go and do not collect anything expect history books and aspirin. 

In short, a lot of commentators seem to me to be looking very shortsightedly at this problem despite claiming they are looking out 10, 12 years.  They are looking out, but they are doing so as through a tunnel: no sense of what's outside, or what the other side of the journey really looks like. I'm skeptical we can ever win in Afghanistan as I define "win", but even if we can I am even more skeptical that the result will be stable enough to justify the costs. The vision in my mind is the kid on the seashore who spends the whole afternoon building the most amazing sand castle ever, besting his own expectation and wowing the spectators. Cool; great; wonderful; amazing. Hey, but then the tide rolls in.

Maybe I'm wrong, but at least I am starting my analysis with all the factors on the table. Those who say we can win, it seems to me, are not.

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