Let's talk just a little about Afghanistan (because I am speechless about the trillion dollar headlines......). The papers say the Obama Administrations wants to dramatically expand the size of the Afghan Army and police, and is prepared to pay a huge amount of money to do it. Everyone from General Barno to Senator Levin are on board with the idea, as are many other analysts whose opinions I have come to respect. So why does the idea make me nervous?

Well, first, I confess that I have to agree that the alternatives to a larger force are not appealing. We can't or at any rate should not do it ourselves, even in coalition with other outsiders. Afghans don't like outsiders in their midst telling them what to do. And it's not a good idea to just let the Taliban 2.0 take over, although it does not necessarily follow that a Taliban 2.0 government would do the same stupid and terrible things the Taliban 1.0 government did--i.e., provide welcome and save haven for al-Qaeda. 

Still. And the "still" comes down to three things. First, and most important, I am not soothed by General Barno's assurances that the army will remain loyal to civilian authority. That depends on whether the civilian authority remains worthy of their loyalty. I have a lot less animosity toward Hamid Karzai than the Obama Administration seems to have.  As I have said before, I don't think they appreciate sufficiently the cultural relativity of corruption. Karzai, or whomever tries to run the country from Kabul, has to be tough, flexible and lucky to make a go of it. He can't act like a Philadelphia lawyer or a boy scout and expect to get anywhere. So the key is whether the government can persuade the army that any cruelty, double-dealing and corruption it deploys it deploys on behalf of the national interest rather than its own pocketbooks. It's not what it does that matters as such; it's the perception of on whose behalf it is done. If Kabul becomes selfish and narrow, we'll end up with a military government there. Karzai will end up either dead or back in India, most likely.  

That, of course, is not the end of the world as far as I am concerned. But it will look like a colossal U.S. policy failure if it happens.  It will look especially heinous because the Obama Administration has dropped the 4th "D" from its vocabulary--the "democracy" D. So a lot of people, no doubt, will conclude that these Democratic Machiavellian realists actually plotted all along that there be a military coup and a military dictatorship in Kabul. It won't be true, but so what?

Second, it is very important how this larger army and police force are recruited and balanced.  If the Pashtun tribal leaders see either one as a front, basically, for the Tajiks or for de-tribalized Pashtuns in league with foreigners, a larger army will just set the stage for the next iteration of civil war.  That would be much worse than a military government in Kabul. In other words, not all larger armies and police forces are created equal.

Third, on a rather different level, I find it sort of amazing that the New York Times can report, and here is how today's article starts, "President Obama and his advisers have decided to significantly expand Afghanistan's security forces. . . ."  Like what, like Afghanistan is Ohio or something?  Like it is normal for one sovereign government to decide how large the security forces of another nominally sovereign government should be?  We fall into this language without even being aware of how weird it is.  We should listen to how we talk sometimes; we might learn a thing or two. 

Obviously, the reason for the seamless obliviousness in the way we talk about these things is that the Afghans themselves cannot afford to build up their own army and police themselves. Still, there appears to be no mention in the article of what the elected Afghan government thinks about this idea. Did we ask them? We're not told.  How can we boast about the Afghan election and Afghanistan's new budding democracy, and then go and make critical decisions about that country's future as if the presidential palace and the parliament were about as relevant to the policy discussion as a day-care center?  If you don't find this attention-arresting, well, what do you find attention-arresting?